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inancial disclosures no longer enjoy the immunity from
criticism they once had. While disclosures remain the
hallmark of numerous areas of regulation, there is
increasing skepticism as to whether disclosures are understood by
consumers and do in fact improve consumer welfare. Debates on
the virtues of disclosures overlook the process by which regulators
continue to mandate disclosures. This article fills this gap by
analyzing the testing of proposed disclosures, which is an
increasingly popular way for regulators to establish the benefits of
disclosure. If the testing methodology is misguided then the
premise on which disclosures are adopted is flawed, leaving
consumers unprotected. This article focuses on two recent major
testing efforts: the European Union's testing of fund disclosure and
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's testing of the
integrated mortgage disclosures, which went into effect on August
1, 2015.
Despite the substantial resources invested in these
quantitative studies, regulation based on study results is unlikely
to benefit consumers since the testing lacks both external and
internal validity. The generalizability of the testing is called into
question since the isolated conditions of testing overlook the reality
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of financial transactions. Moreover, the testing method mistakenly
assumes a direct link between comprehension and improved
decisions, and so erroneously uses comprehension tests.
As disclosure becomes more central to people's daily lives,
from medical decision aids to nutritional labels, greater attention
should be given to the testing policies that justify their
implementation. This article proposes several ways to improve the
content and design of quantitative studies as we enter the era of
testing.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consumers are increasingly required to make financial
decisions in a world in which financial products are becoming
significantly more complex.' With the increased burden on
consumers, an issue that received a considerable amount of
attention following the global financial crisis,2 there is strong
evidence that people are far from being perfect savers, investors
and planners.' Consumers are not always sufficiently numerate or
financially literate to assess financial products and services. 4
Moreover, people face various self-control problems and timeinconsistencies that make long-term decision-making difficult.' It
is clear that financial institutions and financial service providers
are not indifferent to consumer shortcomings, which are often
1 For a discussion of the difference between consumers and investors, see
Niamh Moloney, The Investor Model Underlying the E U's Investor Protection
Regime: Consumers or Investors?, 13 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 169 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Lauren Willis, Decision-making and the Limits of Disclosure:
The Problem of PredatoryLending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 718 (2006) (discussing the increased burden on consumers).
I For summaries of research, see Shlomo Benartzi & Richard Thaler, Heuristicsand Biases in Retirement Savings Behavior,21 J. ECON. PERSP. 81 (2007);
Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of BehavioralFinance,in Handbook of Economics of Finance, 1052-1121 (George M. Constantinides, Milton
Harris & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2003); John Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J.
FIN. 1553 (2006).
I See Annamaria Lusardi, FinancialLiteracy: An Essential Tool for Informed Consumer Choice? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No.
14084, 2008), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w14084; Jill Fisch & Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice (2014), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty-scholarship/415.
5 See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 443 (1997); Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, Doing it Now or
Later, AM. ECON. REV. 103 (1999).
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exploited.6
While consumers face many challenges when making
financial decisions, the regulatory structure of consumer finance
continues, controversially,7 to rely heavily on enhancing decisionmaking by improving disclosures. Opponents of disclosure have
argued that disclosure is "ineffective,"8 does not "result in good
deliberate decision-making,"9 and that it "has failed time after
time, in place after place, in area after area, in method after
method, and in decade after decade."'10 Yet disclosure continues to
play a central role in many domains including the regulation of
consumer finance.
Understanding
how regulators decide to require
disclosures, despite their potential shortcomings, is crucial to any
policy recommendation regarding mandated disclosure. In recent
years, the process of adopting disclosures has changed significantly
as regulators are required to provide stronger evidence of the
benefits and effectiveness of proposed disclosure. Regulators now
tend to recognize the need to replace abstract notions about how
people process and use disclosures with the empirical study of their
impact. Opponents of disclosure have overlooked this change in
policy, claiming that the persistence of disclosure is a result of its

6

See generally Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes,

Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121

Q.J. ECON. 505 (2006); Jennifer Brown, Tanjim Hossain, & John Morgan,
Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression: Evidence from the Field,
125 Q.J. ECON. 859 (2010); Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Fuzzy Math, Disclosure Regulation and Credit Market Outcomes: Evidencefrom Truth-in-Lending Reform, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 506 (2011).
7 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failureof Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED To KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) [hereinafter MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW]; Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures,and How Not to
Judge Their Success or Failure,88 WASH. L. REV. 333 (2013); Willis, supra note
2, at 789; Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 6 (2015).
8 In the context of online disclosures, see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does
Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 94 (2011).
' See Willis, supra note 2, at 712.
'0 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failed Reign of Mandated
Disclosure, REGBLOG (June 15, 2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/06/15/benshahar-schneider-failed-disclosure/.
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political appeal and the excessive belief in "disclosurism. '" In
reality, regulators often do not merely assert the benefits of
disclosure but try to establish the effectiveness of disclosure by
commissioning consumer testing of disclosures." Previous writing
on disclosure, however, has failed to engage with the critical issue
of the process by which disclosures are adopted by regulators,
causing inconsistency between the scholarly debate on disclosure
and the rule-making reality.
This article contributes to our understanding of the
prevalence of disclosure by analyzing the current testing
methodology used to support the adoption of disclosure, showing
that it is inadequate and how it might be improved. I evaluate two
examples of extensive attempts to test disclosure documents prior
to their adoption: the testing of the Integrated Mortgage disclosure
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the United States,
which went into effect on August 1, 2015, and the testing of the
Key Investor Information Document by the European Union,
which was implemented in 2012. The use of quantitative studies
as a means to justify the adoption of disclosures is expected to
expand, given other disclosures that are currently on the agenda of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and other consumer
financial regulators, such as those for payday lending, credit cards,
and insurance. 3
As empirical testing of financial disclosures is becoming the
norm, greater thought must be dedicated to the design and purpose
of this testing if the goal of disclosures is to benefit consumers.
11See infra, Part II.B. Ben-Shahar often uses the term "disclosurites" as
people who refuse to abandon their belief in disclosure even when faced with
evidence of it being ineffective. See MORE THAN You WANTED TO KNOW,
supra note 7, at 6.
12 For a summary of research methods used by the Federal Reserve Board
to test consumer disclosures, see Jeanne Hogarth & Ellen Merry, DesigningDisclosures to Inform Consumer FinancialDecisionmaking:Lessons Learnedfrom
Consumer Testing, 97 FED. RES. BULL. 3 (2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE
BULLETIN 2011].
13

See, e.g., Know Before You Owe: Credit Cards, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/knowbeforeyouowe/
BUREAU,
(last visited Sept. 30, 2015); Prepaid Cards: Help Design a New Disclosure,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/pre-

paid-cards-help-design-a-new-disclosure! (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); Know Before You Owe: Student Loans Project, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/students/knowbeforeyouowe/
Sept. 30, 2015).

(last visited
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First, regulators need to consider the aim of financial disclosures,
such as whether disclosures are intended to make consumers fully
informed, or whether they are meant to influence consumers in a
less deliberative manner.14 I argue that the failure of consumer
financial regulators to adequately articulate the mechanism
through which disclosures assist consumers creates confusion as to
how to judge the effectiveness of disclosures. Second, regulators
must analyze whether current testing methodologies coincide with
this aim. One concern is that comprehension tests, which are
becoming the standard for testing disclosures, may neglect to test
the actual effect of disclosures on financial decisions. While
regulators assume that improving consumer comprehension in the
narrow sense leads to better decisions, improved decision-making
may require a number of steps beyond narrow comprehension.
Third, regulators need to examine and justify the setting in which
they test disclosures given concerns regarding the extent to which
experimental settings can provide information on real-life impact
of disclosures. This could mean either shifting testing
methodologies to real-life testing, such as randomized controlled
trials, or designing experiments that attempt to better capture reallife situations.
The first part of this article provides background on the
way in which disclosure has become a central regulatory tool for
improving consumer protection, and the various premises on
which this strategy relies. I argue that regulators have not always
explicitly recognized how disclosure's effectiveness relies both
upon consumers' understanding of the disclosure and their ability
to apply the information effectively to a financial decision. The
conflation of comprehension and improved decision-making is
behind many of the concerns with current testing practices.
The second part of this article discusses the need to test
proposed disclosures. It explains why regulators have only recently
emphasized disclosure testing, despite the prevalence of financial
disclosures for many decades. It argues that the mounting evidence
on the shortcomings of disclosures and the incorporation of the
insights of behavioral economics into policy, as well as the
14 See, e.g., Bubb, supra note 7, at 115 (discussing the various ways disclosures may affect consumer behavior). Bubb uses the well-known distinction between System 1 and System 2 as a framework of discussing the two ways in
which disclosure can affect behavior-either in a deliberative manner or in a
fast and unconscious way. Id.
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increased stringency of cost-benefit analysis and the recent
emphasis of evidence-based policy, explain the rise of consumer
testing.
The third part of this article explains the prevailing
regulatory testing methodology through two recent examples of
robust empirical testing of disclosure regulation. The first example
is the European Union's testing of the summary prospectus for
retail investment funds, Undertakings for the Collective
Investment of Transferable Securities (UCITS). The second
example is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's testing of
integrated mortgage disclosures in the United States. In both cases,
regulators sought to provide evidence to back their proposed
financial disclosures through a quantitative study. This section
provides background to the proposed policy, describes the
methodology of the quantitative testing, and discusses the results.
In both cases, the testing focused on consumers' comprehension of
the information by asking questions about the content of the
documents while overlooking the impact of the disclosures on
actual decisions.
The fourth part of this article discusses concerns that
current testing practices raise. Current testing has both external
and internal validity problems. It lacks external validity because it
overlooks the ways in which disclosure may have an effect in real
life, and consequently the test results may not be generalizable. It
does not test whether consumers will actually read the disclosure
when not prompted by test questions. It does not test whether
human interaction or other distractions impact the effect of
disclosure. Furthermore, it does not test how the financial industry
will respond to disclosure requirements, relying instead on the
isolated and pro-consumer environment created by regulators
testing the disclosure.
Current testing methodologies also raise internal validity
concerns. Their current focus on narrow comprehension does not
test the stated purpose of disclosure-to improve consumers'
decisions. This section provides several reasons to believe that
comprehension does not necessarily lead to improved decisions.
Current testing efforts, which focus on consumer comprehension,
do not therefore establish whether disclosures will of themselves
improve consumer decisions. For example, relying on disclosures
to make financial decisions requires financial literacy beyond the
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narrow comprehension of the document as well as knowledge of
the consumer's financial situation and how it affects the specific
transactions being considered. Furthermore, the current testing
design does not test additional mechanisms through which
disclosure may assist consumers beyond making consumers fully
informed, such as increasing financial awareness.
The article concludes by describing how regulators can
improve disclosure testing, either by redesigning experimental
testing or by using real-life testing through randomized control
trials and retrospective analysis. While some of the proposals may
be resource-intense, requiring an expansion of testing efforts, many
of the proposals require only a refocusing of the current effort
levels.
Since regulators rely on empirical evidence in formulating
consumer financial regulation, the appropriate focus of scholarly
debate should be the nature of that evidence. As quantitative
testing becomes the standard for good regulation, there is a greater
need to articulate the mechanisms by which they assist consumers,
as well as placing greater focus on the content and design of testing.
By accurately aligning the testing methodology with the purpose
of financial disclosures, as suggested in this article, regulators will
then be able to adopt better-informed regulation that benefits
consumers.

II. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AND THE
PROMINENCE OF DISCLOSURE
Consumer finance, where financial decision-making meets
human psychology, covers many areas of daily life in which people
are required to make complex choices. For example, the move from
Defined Benefit pension plans to Defined Contribution saving
plans requires consumers to estimate their future financial needs
as well as the current amount they need to save to achieve their
future financial goals. In addition, many savings plans require
consumers to decide how to invest the assets that are saved.
Consumers seeking credit have many more options than in the
past, both in terms of types of credit issuers and the terms of credit.
Many types of consumer loans have become far more complex, an
issue that received a considerable amount of attention following
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the global financial crisis. 15
There is often a significant gap between the knowledge and
planning abilities required for informed financial decisions, and
those that people with limited time and financial literacy can
reasonably be expected to possess. The existence of these market
imperfections is largely recognized, so current debates focus on the
extent to which they are prevalent and the appropriate regulatory
response.
A. The Goals of Consumer FinancialRegulation
Defining the precise goal of consumer financial protection
can be challenging given the departure from classic justifications
for financial regulation in general. Traditional justifications for
financial regulation relate to classic market failures that would
cause financial market imperfections. Some of the traditional
financial regulation justifications can also apply to consumer
financial markets, such as the existence of information
asymmetries in insurance markets and high searching costs of
credit terms.16 However, the classic framework seems insufficient
in capturing the challenges facing unsophisticated consumers,
especially when the mere availability of information itself is not
the real source of concern for many consumers."
If consumers with limited financial literacy face cognitive
limitations and biases, what should regulation aim to achieve? If
the goal is to improve consumer financial outcomes, 8 the efforts to
increase financial literacy and awareness of the terms of products
and services would be the means to achieving that end. Even if the
end goal is to improve consumer welfare, 9 it may be that this is
i' See, e.g., Willis, supra note 2, at 718.
16. See John Campbell, et al., Consumer FinancialProducts, 25 J. ECON.
PERSP. 91 (2011).

Some have articulated this type of regulation as regulating "internalities."
See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Cass Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. (forthcoming 2015).
18 This article does not deal directly with the question of what a "good" decision is. Rather, it assumes that a good decision is one that increases a person's
welfare. While there are many aspects of life in which there is significant uncertainty as to what increases one's welfare, in the context of consumer finance, in
which one's objective is primarily pecuniary gain, these questions are less important. This approach is consistent with the broader context of practice and
literature in consumer finance.
19 There is a sense in which people making decisions increase their welfare.
17
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best achieved through improving consumer decision-making
rather than having regulators decide for people. Another
possibility is that the concern is about lack of consumer agency
caused by impaired decision-making. According to this view,
regulation aims to empower consumers through making their
decisions informed, regardless of whether consumer decisions
actually improve their financial outcomes. If this were the goal of
regulation, we would test the success of regulation using criteria
such as the level of understanding of consumers or their subjective
feeling of empowerment. The evaluation of the methodology of
regulatory testing requires a clear understanding of how regulators
view the goal of consumer financial regulation and the problem to
which regulation needs to respond.
However, financial regulators have not been clear
regarding the goal of consumer financial protection. In the past this
was partially due to the fragmentation of consumer financial
regulation, whereby consumer financial regulation often fell under
the authority of the regulator of a particular industry.2" These
regulators adhered to traditional justifications for financial
regulation, presuming a generally functioning financial market
with rational players in which regulation is needed only for specific
failures.21

For a full discussion on this topic, see CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE?: THE
POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM (2015).
20 For a more comprehensive analysis of the structure of financial regulation in various European countries, see Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of FinancialSupervision in Europe: About Single FinancialSupervisors,Twin Peaks
and Multiple FinancialSupervisors, 8 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 237 (2007). Some
countries, like the UK, followed an integrated model of financial regulation in
which the Financial Services Authority oversaw all financial regulation. In the
US, regulation followed a fragmented model of regulation, primarily along institutional lines. Despite these differences, both models did not include a separation between prudential regulators and conduct regulators. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL TAYLOR, "TWIN PEAKS": A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE
NEW CENTURY (1995). On the fragmentation of consumer financial protection,
see Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 15 7 PENN. L. REV.
1 (2008).
21 Traditional justifications for financial regulation can be more nuanced
than presented here. For example, in the context of securities regulation Gilson
and Kraakman recognize the existence of unsophisticated investors, but argue
that the existence of informed investors provides protection of unsophisticated
investors. See Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 569 (1984). A more accurate characterization
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The mission statements and mandates of consumer
financial protection regulators since the financial crisis do little to
resolve the uncertainties. According to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau ("CFPB"),12 its "mission is to make markets for
consumer financial products and services work for Americans." 3
While this may imply a focus on consumer welfare, the CFPB
continues to explain that "[a]bove all, this means ensuring that
consumers get the information they need to make the financial
decisions they believe are best for themselves and their families,'24
thereby emphasizing the subjective goal of empowering
consumers. Does the CFPB hold that a decision one believes is best
in fact increases one's welfare? Or do they merely believe they
should be concerned with whether people deem their decision as
best, regardless of the actual welfare outcome? Despite the
importance of the distinction, the CFPB fails to recognize the
difference between the welfare outcomes and empowering
decision-making, or even discuss the way in which they interact.25
Mission statements are unlikely to act as a daily guide to the work
of traditional justifications of financial regulation is that the existence of unsophisticated investors was not perceived as fundamentally undermining the functioning of an efficient market. This too has been challenged in recent years. See,
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:A Behavioral Analysis, 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000); Stephen Choi & A. C. Pritchard, BehavioralEconomics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by
the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequencesfor Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003).
22 The CFPB was established under Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act as a centralized body for consumer protection, concerns that were often previously dealt with by several separate age ncies. The powers of the CFPB include the authority to administer, enforce, and
implement federal consumer financial laws. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (2010).
23 The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consum-

erfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
24 Id. (emphasis added).
25 The CFPB's 2013 Strategic Plan is also vague regarding these distinctions. See Strategic Plan FY 2013-FY 2017, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU
(2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/strategic-plan.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN]. Goal 1, to prevent financial harm to consumers while
promoting good practices that benefit them, and Goal 2, to empower consumers
to live better financial lives, focus on providing consumers with information and
preventing abuse. "Preventing financial harm" seems to be primarily concerned
with the welfare result for consumers, while the "outcomes" the CFPB defines
as its goals focus mainly on providing consumers with information. Despite the
importance of the distinction, the CFPB fails to recognize the difference between
the welfare outcomes and decision-making aids or to discuss the way in which
they interact.
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of the CFPB; however, they do provide insight into the agency's
strategic vision, which is used to define its tasks.
The distinction between the ends and means of regulation
is recognized in the goals of the recently established Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) in the United Kingdom, responsible for
regulating financial services for the protection of consumers. One
of the goals of the FCA is to "promote good outcomes for
consumers," 26 where "[a] further important way to promote good
outcomes for retail consumers is to equip them with information so
that they can avoid risks and protect themselves, 2 7 thereby
recognizing improving decision-making as the means of achieving
better financial outcomes.
A slightly different view is presented in the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) survey of Consumer Credit Protection,
which states that "[cjonsumer protection is not about protecting
consumers from bad decisions but about enabling consumers to
make informed decisions in a marketplace free of deception and
abuse. '2 The FSB does not, however, explain how an uninformed
decision differs from a bad decision.
Although I have only discussed how the FCA and the
CFPB perceive the role of consumer financial regulation, similar
vagueness about this role exists in other countries.29 In general,
regulators assume that providing consumers with information will
lead them to make better decisions that will improve financial
outcomes, a position not properly articulated or justified. This,
26

The definition of the goals of the FCA can be found in a document of the

Financial Services Authority, the centralized financial regulator in the UK dissolved in 2013, which sets out the goals of the newly created FCA. See The Financial Conduct Authority: Approach to Regulation, FIN. SERV. AUTH. (2011),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk!pubs/events/fca-approach.pdf [hereinafter
FSA DOCUMENT]. For a critical analysis of the abolition of the Financial Services Authority and creation of the Financial Conduct Authority, see Eilis Ferran, The Break-up of the FinancialServices Authority, 31 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 455 (2011).
27 FSA DOCUMENT, supra note 26, at 17.
28 Consumer Finance Protection With Particular Focus on Credit, FIN.
STABILITY BD, (2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wpcontent/uploads/rl 1102 6a.pdf [hereinafter FSB REPORT].
29 For further discussion of consumer protection in various countries, see
id. See also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., G20 HIGH LEVEL
PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL CONSUMER PROTECTION (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/48892010.pdf.
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however, is not true if people ignore the information disclosed," do
not understand the disclosure or do not use the information to
make better decisions." The assumed link between disclosure and
improved outcomes is largely what causes misguided regulatory
testing of proposed disclosures.
B. The Role of Disclosure
There are various types of regulatory responses aimed at
protecting financial consumers. Regulators may choose to regulate
financial products directly. For example, regulators may ban
certain financial products3 2 while restricting access to others.3 3
Another type of regulatory intervention is creating structural
requirements that are meant to protect consumers. Rather than
regulating the financial product, this regulatory strategy aims at
regulating the financial sector players.34

30 Carlos Jensen, Colin Potts & Christine Jensen, Privacy Practicesand In-

ternet Users: Self-reports Versus Observed Behavior, 203 INT'L J. HUMANCOMPUTER STUD. 63 (2005).
31 There is a large amount of literature on how people do not save, even
when prompted to by their employer and when they believe they should be saving. See, e.g., Gabriel Carroll, et al., Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions, 124
Q. J. ECON. 1639 (2009); James Choi, David Laibson, & Brigitte Madrian, $100
Bills on the Sidewalk: Violations of No-Arbitrage in 401(k) Accounts, 93 REV.
OF ECON. & STAT. 748 (2011).
32 Such regulation is often perceived as more legitimate when a product is
deceptive or unfair. For example, in January 2013, the CFPB issued a rule banning balloon payments and repayment penalties on high-cost mortgages. See
High-Cost Mortgage and Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) and Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 79 Fed. Reg.
6855 (Jan. 10, 2013), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/high-cost-mortgage-and-homeownership-counseling-amendments-to-regulation-z-and-homeownership-counseling-amendments-to-regulation-x/. Other
examples include restrictions on assets held by pension funds and restrictions on
retain investment funds.
33 For example, according to Regulation D only investors who fulfill certain
criteria can invest in hedge funds. See 17 CFR 230.506. Lighter versions of regulation of financial products include the use of defaults from which financial
institutions may opt out of exposing them to tightened regulation.
34 A classic example is the creation of fiduciary duties meant to align incentives of firms with those of the consumers. Another type of structural imposition
is the requirement of gatekeepers, such as independent directors on mutual fund
boards.
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1. The Prominence of Disclosure as a Regulatory Tool
Although consumer financial regulators have employed
several of the above strategies in various contexts, in many
jurisdictions regulation relies primarily on empowering consumer
decision-making. Various governmental and private efforts, both
through formal education channels, such as seminars in schools, as
well as informal education, have tried to increase consumer
literacy. Results have been mixed."
The most common strategy is the regulation of information
given to consumers. This type of regulation can take many forms,
from requiring information to be disclosed,3 6 to prohibiting
information that may be misleading. 7 Regulators often choose
themselves to provide or sponsor information, allowing consumers
to compare information in a credible and neutral setting.38
Regulatory efforts focused on enhancing consumer
decision-making disclosure are perceived as autonomy-promoting
as well as preserving the appearance that consumer finance is
"5 For a survey of consumer education efforts see Annamaria Lusardi &
Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of FinancialLiteracy: Theory and
Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5,29-33 (2014). See also Justine S. Hastings,
Brigitte C. Madrian & William L. Skimmyhorn, FinancialLiteracy, Financial
Education and Economic Outcomes, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 347 (2013).
36 Pre-contractual requirements may oblige that consumers receive certain
disclosures at certain times before entering a contract, like the TILA and
RESPA disclosures discussed in Section III. Other requirements include postcontractual mandated disclosures and ongoing reporting, often required of financial institutions. In many cases the form, as well as content of disclosure is
closely regulated. Other types of disclosure requirements include the disclosure
of conflicts of interest.
31 This could be done through the regulation of marketing and advertising,
such as the limitations placed on mutual fund advertising.
38 See,
e.g. Fund Analyzer, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://apps.finra.org/fundanalyzer/l/fa.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); Paying
for College: Compare Financial Aid, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/paying-for-college/compare-financial-aidand-college-cost/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2015) (CFPB's tool to compare college
costs and financial aid offers). For more details on the various types of consumer
financial protection, see FSB REPORT, supra note 28, at 12-18 (survey of various
country). On regulation in middle income countries, see Susan Rutledge, Consumer Protectionand FinancialLiteracy, (World Bank Pol'y Res., Working Paper
No.
5326,
2010),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTORResources/ConsumerPr
otectionandFin LiteracyWPS5326.pdf.
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primarily based on fair market interactions. 9 In a context in which
financial engagements are an exercise of free choice, it seems
natural that disclosure becomes a central part of regulation.40 First,
disclosure is appealing since it is perceived as a light form of
regulation, as it does not alter the market significantly. In fact,
supporters of disclosure argue that informing consumers enhances
the functioning of the free-market. Ben-Shahar and Schneider
argue that disclosure is alluring because it appeals to fundamental
American ideology of autonomy and that people "are entitled as a
matter of moral right and of practical policy to make the decisions
that shape their lives."4' Second, disclosure is often more politically
practical, 42 and, as is argued in more detail below, it avoids solving
complex regulatory questions, such as what decisions actually
improve consumer welfare. The centrality of disclosure to
consumer financial regulation can also be explained by the
importance of disclosure to financial regulation and investor
protection in general.4 3
31 FSB REPORT, supra note 28, at 15. According to the FSB, "Most jurisdictions are working to enable consumers to make better informed consumer credit
decisions in a safer marketplace. They are strengthening consumer education
and consumer protection, and disclosure requirements for both basic and complex products."
40 For an overview of the philosophical underpinnings of disclosure, see
Matthew Edwards, The Virtue of Mandatory Disclosure, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 47 (2014).
41 MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW, supra note 7, at 5.

Omri Ben Shachar & Carl Schneider, The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis in FinancialDisclosure Regulation (U. Mich. L. Sch. L. & Econ., Working
Paper No. 100, 2014) [hereinafter Futility of CBA].
43 The Securities Act of 1933 and the creation of the SEC with the passing
of the Securities Act of 1934 were premised on a market failure of insufficient
information in the market. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984);
John C. Coffee, Market Failureand the Economic Casefor Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). It is unclear to what degree such justifications for disclosure should hold for other consumer financial transactions, particularly when they involve privately negotiated agreements. See, e.g., Howell
Jackson, Regulation in Multisectored FinancialServices Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319 (1999). In addition, many investment vehicles, such as mutual funds, are retail vehicles in which sophisticated investors
do not participate. See John Coates & Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implicationsfor Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151
(2007) (discussing the degree to which sophisticated investors may protect the
unsophisticated). An additional concern is that in markets in which knowledgeable and non-knowledgeable consumers can be distinguished. For example, the
sub-prime market being for poorer and less sophisticated households. See Willis,
supra note 2, at 762.
42
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2. Why Disclosure May Benefit Consumers
A prerequisite for regulators to adequately test their
proposed disclosure is an explicit theory of the way in which
disclosures benefit consumers. Similar to the existing vagueness on
the role of consumer protection, regulators have not been explicit
as to how disclosure assists consumers.
This ambiguity is apparent from the early days of consumer
financial regulation. Edward Rubin discusses the adoption of the
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") in 1968, the first consumer
financial protection legislation. Edward Rubin asks with respect
to TILA: "what was the goal of legislation, consumer protection or
disclosure? '44 Rubin argues that the way in which the Act was
adopted assumes the solution of disclosure "precludes an explicit
inquiry into the bedrock goals of the legislative effort." 45 Rubin
argues that TILA involved a conflation between instrumentalities
and goals, also apparent in today's regulation.
a. Consumer Responses to Disclosure
The claim that disclosure improves consumer welfare,
based on consumer responses to disclosures, relies on establishing
a number of links. For example, there is the link between receiving
financial disclosures and reading and then understanding their
content. This is the connection between exposure to disclosure and
comprehension. Second, there must be a connection between
understanding the information and making an informed decision.
In other words, comprehension needs to lead to improved decisionmaking.46

Edward Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the TruthIn-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 283 (1991).
44

41 Id. at 285.
46 This list is

not exhaustive. For example, there also must be a connection
between whether a decision an individual believes is best for them, and whether
it truly is a good decision, if regulation is concerned with consumer welfare. Also,
there must be a link between a good financial decision (at the time of the decision) and financial outcomes that may materialize far in the future and are
shaped by economic realities unknown at the time of the decision. Ben Shachar
and Schneider discuss further links that are required for disclosure to succeed
including that the lawmakers impose the right mandates and that disclosers
obey the disclosure requirement. See MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW,
supra note 7, at 34.
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However, there is a significant amount of evidence that the
first of these links fails, in that people do not understand financial
disclosures, or even attempt to read them. 47 This has led many
authors to doubt the effectiveness of disclosures in helping
consumers. Other authors, however, have advanced a more
nuanced perspective, looking to define when disclosures are more
likely to succeed.48 In a recent article by Loewenstein, Sunstein,
and Golman, 9 the authors state that "important and reasonable
questions have been raised about the efficacy of disclosure
requirements,"'50 and based on research in the field of behavioral
economics, they suggest a few guidelines as to how disclosure may
be improved. The ways to improve disclosure include information
simplification, standardization, social comparison information,
and vividness.
Regulatory testing can be seen as the response to much of
this literature, as it recognizes the possible pitfalls of disclosure and
the difficulty in determining its comprehensibility in the abstract.
As the literature on the ways in which disclosure might succeed or
fail continues to grow, it is clear that the terms of this debate are
insufficiently defined. Most importantly, it is unclear what the
criterion is for the success or failure of a disclosure. For example,
is it necessary that the document in its entirety be understood? Do
have to understand disclosures for them to be a
all readers
"success"?5 1 This is particularly apparent in the examples discussed
below, where the EU and CFPB adopt disclosures based partially
on low comprehension results without providing any relevant
benchmark.

4 Id. at 33-54; see further discussion infra, Part 11.1.
48

See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM, & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE:

THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2008) [hereinafter FULL

DISCLOSURE]; Lauren Willis, The Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau and
the Quest for Consumer Comprehension (May 14, 2015), available at http://paMORE THAN YOU
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2606373;
WANTED TO KNOW, supra note 7, at 12 1-137; Bubb, supra note 7, at 107.
41 See George Loewenstein, Cass Sunstein & Russell Golman, Disclosure:
Psychology Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391 (2014).
50 Id. at 398.
51 Richard Craswell has suggested a distinction between static disclosure,
relating to the specific attributes of a product, and dynamic disclosure, relating
to the directional impact of attributes, giving sellers incentives to improve their
products. Which of these two types of disclosure should be the focus of a comprehensible disclosure? See generally Craswell, supra note 7.
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b. Supply Side Effects of Disclosure
Another way in which disclosure can increase consumer
financial protection is through the effect of mandatory disclosures
on those that supply them. Requiring loan originators to disclose
their terms and mutual funds to disclose their fees may make
financial institutions alter their provisions to avoid adverse
consequences of harmful terms being public," thereby not relying
directly on consumer comprehension. Classic examples of
disclosure systems that have altered the behavior of disclosers,
while it is highly questionable whether consumers notice this
information when making a purchase, include food nutritional
labels53 and restaurant hygiene disclosures.54
While this theory provides an explanation for how
disclosure can be beneficial even when many or even most
consumers do not understand the disclosure, it nevertheless does
rely on a group of users being sensitive to the information being
disclosed. For example, it relies on the existence of an informed
minority who understands the disclosure55 and can protect
uninformed consumers or consumers partially understanding the
disclosure. 6 The theory could also rely on an intermediary who is
able to interpret the information in a way that can create a

See David Weil, The Benefits and Costs of Transparency:A Model of Disclosure Based Regulation (2002).
13 See FULL DISCLOSURE 2007, supra note 48, at Chapter 4. For a nuanced
analysis of the cases in which disclosure of nutritional value led to improved
nutrition of products. See Christine Moorman, Rosellina Ferraro & Joel Huber,
Unintended Nutrition Consequences:Firm Responses to the Nutrition Labeling
and EducationAct, 31 MARKETING SCI. 717 (2012).
14 See FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 48, at Chapter 4. For a skeptical account of the impact of restaurant hygiene grading. See Daniel Ho, Fudging the
Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574
52

(2012).

51 See Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information:A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
630 (1979). In general, the more private consumer interactions are the less one
can rely on an informed minority. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will
Increased Disclosure Help? EvaluatingRecommendations of the ALI's "Principles of the Law of Software Contracts", 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165 (2011).
56 See Craswell, supra note 7, at 342 for example Craswell's characterization of "dynamic disclosures" in which sellers alter their products because consumers respond to the levels of an attribute even when they fall short of being
fully informed.
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consumer response. 5 However, it is questionable whether such
mechanisms exist for many consumer financial products that deal
with private contracts, and not uniform products, or products that
are primarily for unsophisticated consumers.
To summarize this section, since regulatory testing is meant
to confirm whether the proposed rule will achieve its goal, laying
out the goals of regulation is essential in assessing testing efforts.
While financial regulators ultimately wish to improve consumer
welfare, they focus on decision-making and providing information
to consumers, confusing the ends and means of regulation.
The current philosophy of consumer financial regulation
focuses on enhancing consumer autonomy, in which disclosure
plays a dominant role. As financial disclosures have increasingly
been subject to criticism, their effectiveness needs to be established
by empirical testing. This point is further developed in the next
section.

II. WHY TEST FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES?
Rigorous testing of proposed regulation, particularly
quantitative studies, is a fairly recent development. In the context
of financial disclosures, The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve Board") has sponsored a
number of quantitative studies since 2007.58 Regulatory testing of
proposed financial disclosures has become more prevalent,
particularly after the financial crisis, for two main reasons. First,
changes that have taken place regarding perceptions of the average
consumer based on evidence that people do not understand or read
disclosures, as well theoretical changes in economic theory, have
increased disclosure skepticism necessitating verification of its
effectiveness.
The second explanation is the increased rigor of cost-benefit
analysis and data-driven analysis that requires regulators to
present concrete evidence as to the benefit of proposed regulation.
In the context of disclosure, this has led to quantitative testing of
financial disclosures.

"7See FULL DISCLOSURE, supra note 48, at 61.
18 See FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 2011, supra note 12.
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A. Changes in Theory of Consumer Behavior

When mandated financial disclosures became an important
component of financial regulation in the 1930s, little attention was
given to the importance of the presentation and format of the
information. Instead, the focus was on the mere release of
information into the public domain. As the use of financial
disclosures increased, there was greater concern regarding the
ability of consumers to understand many pages of technical and
legalistic language.6 ° Moreover, disclosure was increasingly used in
the context of individual consumer financial contracts, like
insurance and mortgage contracts, in addition to capital markets.
While the government can reduce information costs for consumers,
some costs may persist, particularly when shopping for credit,
reducing the impact of disclosure.6 1
However, evidence of actual impact of disclosures, as well
as broader research in the field of behavioral economics,
undermined the theory behind disclosure whereby as long as the
effort is worth consumers' while, they will invest in understanding
disclosures.6 ' Research showed that people had difficulty
understanding disclosures in a way not limited to lack of expertise,
and that people did not read disclosures, even when making
significant financial decisions or when disclosures were not
significantly long. 63 Furthermore, it was shown that people do not
11 See, e.g.

LOuIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE

USE IT (2009). Brandeis says: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases." Id. at 62. The economic formalization of
the benefit of financial disclosures began to be articulated in the late 70s and
early 80s, while also focusing on the connection between publicly available information and market efficiency. See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
60 For a further account of the increased use of disclosures and emphasis on
transparency from the 1980s, see Archon Fung, et al., The PoliticalEconomy of
Transparency:What makes disclosurepolicies effective?, HARVARD U. JOHN F.
BANKERS

KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV'T, 8 (2004).

61 For such an analysis in the context of TILA and RESPA disclosures, see
Jinkook Lee & Jeanne Hogarth, Consumer Information Searchfor Home Mortgages: Who, What, How Much, and What Else?, 9 FIN. SERVICES REV. 277

(2000).
62

See supra, Part I.B.2.a.

63

See

ANJAN

V.

THAKORE, JESS

C.

BELTZ,

&

Jo

ANN S. BAREFOOT,

COMMON GROUND: INCREASING CONSUMER BENEFITS AND REDUCING
REGULATORY COSTS IN BANKING (1993); Willis, supra note 2, at 766; Rubin,

supra note 44, at 235; Matthew Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques
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understand basic financial concepts, and they overlook
information that is not easily understood.6 4 Indications that
disclosure may be harder to understand than thought at the time
mandated went beyond financial disclosures to other disclosures
66
such as nutrition labels65 and medical informed consent.
Regulators mandating financial disclosures have been slow
in addressing the full impact of this evidence. It is clear that
regulators see the need to engage with the users of disclosure when
developing disclosure requirements; however, they often fall short
of truly questioning their effectiveness. Prior to quantitative
testing, the basis for the adoption of disclosure requirements was
either the regulator's theory as to what information would be
important and useful for consumers or even the stated preferences
of consumers or the regulated industry. 67 Testing efforts by the
Federal Reserve Board in the 1990s mostly included focus groups
in which consumers were asked to comment on proposed
disclosures.6 8 This form of consumer engagement, through eliciting
their preferences for the disclosure document, has serious
limitations as consumers are often confused themselves about what
information is important in comparing financial offers.

of Mandatory Disclosure:Socio-Economics and the Questfor Truth in Lending,
14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 199, 229 (2005).

64 See Rubin, supra note 44, at 236; William Whitford, The Functions of
Disclosure Regulations in Consumer Transactions, 2 WiSc. L. REV. 400 (1973).
For a comprehensive survey of the various challenges facing consumers, see Angelo Capuano & Ian Ramsay, What Causes Suboptimal FinancialBehaviour?
An Exploration of FinancialLiteracy, Social Influences and Behavioural Eco-

nomics, CENTRE FOR CORP. L. AND SEC. REG., U. MELBOURNE, (2011).
65 Alan Levy, Sara Fein & Raymond Schucker, Performance Characteristics of Seven Nutrition Label Formats, 15 J. OF PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 1
(1996).
66 Barrie Cassileth, Informed Consent-Why are Its Goals Imperfectly Realized?, 302 N. ENGL. J. MED. 896 (1980). See MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW, supra note 7, at 43.
67 See Rubin, supra note 44, at 300 ("[T]heir efforts to determine the statute's actual effects were largely limited to speculation."). See also SEC Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option For Registered Openend Management Investment Companies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4546 (Jan. 26, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-8998fr.pdf(describingthe steps taken before the SEC adopted the Summary Prospectusfor mutual funds) [hereinafter
SEC SUMMARY PROSPECTUS]. Prior to the adoption of the SEC SUMMARY
PROSPECTUS, the SEC hosted a roundtable with investor group representatives
and held investor focus group testing.
68 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 2011, supra note 12, at 4.
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In some areas the recognition that disclosures often failed
to assist people in making financial decisions led regulators to
adopt new disclosures, meant to address behavioral concerns, only
to later reject them for being ineffective.6 9 One possible reason for
the repeated shortcomings of updated disclosures is that they rely
on abstract notions of how disclosure formats help consumers.
Thus, the effect of disclosure could be determined only through the
testing of disclosure documents prior to their adoption.7 0
Recent years have marked a change as to how financial
regulators adopt disclosures. In 2004, the Federal Reserve Board
created a more rigorous testing program to inform the
development of financial disclosures, adding elements beyond
focus groups, such as usability testing and quantitative validation
surveys. This is clearly reflected in the Federal Reserve Board's
summary of consumer testing of disclosures from 2004 to 2011,
emphasizing the learning process of disclosure testing.7' In a staff
report of the Federal Trade Commission from 2007 that tested the
effectiveness of mortgage disclosures, the authors state: "testing is
69 For example, as will be discussed in Part III, the European Commission
replaced the simplified prospectus, meant to provide a short standardized document in simple English, with the Key Investor Information Document, meant
to provide a similar function.
Another example is the 1968 Truth in Lending Act mandated disclosures, which
have been reviewed and changed several times. See Part III.B. The process
through which TILA disclosures have been amended within short periods of
time, despite the persistence of the overall goals of TILA, raises questions as to
how TILA disclosures are adopted in the first place. While many changes relate
to the increased complexity of loan terms, for example the proliferation of adjustable rate mortgages, documents are often deemed non-user friendly sometimes within only years after they are implemented. For an in depth analysis of
the situation of mortgage consumers in 2007. See JAMES LACKO & JANIS
PAPPALARDO, FED. TRADE COMM'N, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE
DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PROTOTYPE
DISCLOSURE FORMS (2007) [hereinafter FTC REPORT 2007].
70 Others have argued that this is partially because the Federal Reserve

Board lacks expertise and motivation to focus on consumer financial protection.
See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Fixing Consumer ProtectionLaws So Borrowers Understand Their Payment Obligations,48 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 17 (2014). See also
FTC REPORT 2007, supra note 69, at 7 ("Despite the importance of consumer
mortgage decisions, decades of experience with federal mortgage disclosures, a
general perception that these disclosures are inadequate and confusing, and repeated calls for improvement, little empirical evidence exists to document the
effect of the current disclosures on consumer understanding of mortgage costs,
consumer mortgage shopping, or consumer mortgage choice.").
71 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 2011, supra note 12.
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essential to ensure that the disclosures effectively convey the
desired information to consumers, 7 2 and that "[w]ithout testing, it
73
is difficult to know what information is conveyed to consumers.
The creation of the CFPB may also mark the increased
incorporation of behavioral economics research into regulatory
policy.7 4 Furthermore, the CFPB's Strategic Plan includes as one
of its goals the conduction of "qualitative and quantitative research
to deepen understanding of consumer decision making."75 The next
section discusses the CFPB's most extensive consumer study to
date, testing mortgage disclosures, reflecting the Strategic Plans'
goal of research-driven, evidence-based perspectives on consumer
behavior.
Although the creation of the CFPB and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) testing marks
recognition of the importance of consumer testing, current
financial regulation has not fully abandoned abstract notions of
reasonable consumer behavior. The basic regulatory structure has
remained intact - consumer financial protection relies heavily on
consumer decision-making, yet testing overlooks decision-making
and focuses on comprehension of disclosures instead. As discussed
in Part IV, it is theories of consumer rationality that assume the
connection between comprehension and decision-making, and
therefore regulators that rely on this connection have not fully
incorporated behavioral economics research.
B. Increased Stringency of Regulatory Impact Assessments
The increased use of consumer testing to validate financial
disclosures can also be explained by the more general trend of
evidence-based policy and regulation.
Cost-benefit analysis ("CBA") is a fundamental part of
regulation in the United States.7 6 Although CBA has many
72 FTC REPORT 2007, supra note 69, at 13.
71 Id. at 128.

" See Dee Prigden, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection:
Stronger Agency and StrongerLaws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 406 (2013) (claiming
that the birth of the CFPB is a shift "to a system of regulation-based on the more
realistic view of consumer decision-making as revealed by behavioral economics").
" STRATEGIC PLAN, supranote 25, at 2 7.
76 It dates back to 1974 when Council on Wage and Price Stability
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opponents,7 7 it seems clear that CBA is fairly entrenched in the
current regulatory regime. Agencies are producing increasingly
longer and more sophisticated analyses, which are then reviewed
by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") and
sometimes courts, while investing considerable resources in their
production.7 8 The increased stringency of CBA means that
agencies are now required to produce more concrete evidence on
the benefits and costs of regulation, as well as a monetized estimate
of the benefits and costs.79
Even for agencies that did engage in CBA, this analysis was
rarely applied in the case of mandated disclosures. 0 Although it
has been argued that "informal cost-benefit analysis" constantly
takes place under the assumption that disclosure of information
has potentially significant benefits while its costs are low, 8 1 there
has been little formal analysis, particularly of alternative
regulatory measures or even alternative disclosure options. This is
likely to change given the growing skepticism of the effectiveness
("COWPS") created in 1974 assumed the role of CBA of regulation. Its successor,
the Regulatory Analysis Review Group ("RARG"), was set up during the Carter
Administration. In 1981 during the Regan Administration, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") was created within the White House's
Office of Management Budget ("OMB"), and was responsible for regulatory
oversight of all major federal agency rules. Although at the time OIRA was considered by many as a mechanism to facilitate deregulation by creating significant hurdles to rule-making, its functioning was continued by the Clinton Administration. Executive Order 12866, issued by President Clinton in 1993,
remains the fundamental guidelines as to OIRA's authority and the principles
of rulemaking. In 2011 President Obama issued Executive Order 13565, reaffirming Executive Order 12866 as well as adding additional principles, such as
the need to examine existing regulation. For an overview of the history of CBA
and its prominence in American regulatory decision-making, see CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION (2002).
17 See,
e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN ACKERMAN & LISA HEIZERLING,
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF
NOTHING (2005); PETER DORMAN, MARKETS AND MORTALITY: ECONOMICS,
DANGEROUS WORK, AND THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE (2009).
7 See Stuart Shapiro, The Evolution of Cost-Benefit Analysis in U.S. Regulatory Decisionmaking,in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 385
(David Levi-Faur ed., 2011).
'9 In the context of privacy notices, see Loretta Garrison, et al., Designing
Evidence-based Disclosures: A Case Study of Financial Privacy Notices, J.
CONSUMER AFF. 204 (2012).
8o Futility of CBA, supra note 42, at 3.
81

Id. at 4.
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of financial disclosures. When the benefits are no longer assumed,
they will have to convincingly be established, which will
necessitate consumer testing.
The same is likely to be true for independent agencies,
primarily responsible for financial disclosures, which are not
subject to OIRA's review." For example, the Securities Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), responsible for mutual fund oversight
including mutual fund disclosure, has not emphasized CBA in its
rulemaking in the past.13 However, in March 2012 the SEC
circulated the Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC
Rulemaking, 4 which requires that the benefits and costs of rules
be clearly identified and quantified, likely to increase future
empirical testing of regulation.8 5
They are also not covered by the requirements of Executive Order 12866
and OMB Circular A-4. Although many rules of independent agencies contain
an impact analysis, they have been considered less robust than the analyses of
agencies reviewed by OIRA. For example the National Securities Market Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §77b(b), requires the SEC to consider effects of its
regulation, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 itself requires the SEC to
consider the impact of its regulation on competition. On the lower level of rigor
of these analyses see the OMB Annual Report from 2012, which questions the
rigor of independent agencies' cost benefit analyses. OFF. MGMT & BUDGET,
82

OFF. INFO. AND REG. AFF. 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE,
LOCAL,
AND
TRIBAL
ENTITIES
(2013),
available
at

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2013_cb/2013_costbenefit-report-updated.pdf.
83 This is clear from reviewing the Final Rule of the Summary Prospectus
(the example discussed in the introduction to this paper) that contains little analysis on concrete benefits to consumers. See SEC SUMMARY PROSPECTUS, supra
note 67.
84 Memorandum from the RSFI & OGC, Secs. & Exch. Comm'n, to Staff
of the Rulewriting Divisions and Offices (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi-guidanceeconanalysecrulemaking.pdf.This followed a
report of the Government Accountability Office and recent court decisions challenging the SEC's cost-benefit analysis. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412
F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (challenging the SEC rule that boards mutual funds
have at least 75% independent directors and an independent chairman); Am.
Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (challenging the
SEC rule that classified fixed indexed annuities be subject to federal securities
regulation); Bus. Roundtable & U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 647 F.3d
1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (challenging a rule regarding companies' proxy materials
to shareholders)).
85 See Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigmsin FinancialRegulation (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 660, 2013);
See also Maeve Carey, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL77775, COST-BENEFIT AND
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Similarly, the CFPB, also an independent agency, s6 sees
evidence-based policy and data-driven regulation as a
fundamental part of its Strategic Plan. Moreover, Dodd-Frank,
establishing the authority and responsibilities of the CFPB,
requires that the CFPB conduct a CBA on its proposed rules."
Dodd-Frank also explicitly requires that disclosures mandated by
88
the CFPB be validated through consumer testing.
A similar trend can be seen outside the US. Since 2002, any
new initiative of the European Commission requires an Impact
Assessment. Such an assessment includes the consideration of
economic, social and environmental consequences of new rules.
The Commission has published various guidelines on preparing
impact assessments 9 and created the Impact Assessment Board in
2006, which advises and scrutinizes impact assessments.90 This
likely indicates the increased use of empirical testing of regulation,
which is seen in the example discussed next, the Key Investor
Information Document. The basic similarities between the
structure of impact assessments and CBA, as well as the oversight
of the Impact Assessment Board and OIRA, have led to claims of
convergence on the analytic basis for regulation across the
Atlantic.91
OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2014),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41974.pdf(quoting the statement of the
SEC Chairmanfrom 2011).
86 The CFPB is also not subject to OIRA's review and Executive Orders
12866 and 13563.
87 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter as Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §1022(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
88 Dodd-Frank §1032(b)(3).
89 Impact Assessment Guidelines, SECURITIES EXCH. COMM'N 92 (Jan. 15,
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/commission-guidelines/docs/
iag_2009_en.pdf.
90 Similarly, with regards to lower level rule-making, the Committee of European Securities Regulators ("CESR") along with the Committee of European
Banking Supervisors and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisor, created Impact Assessment Guidelines for level 3
committees emphasizing the need for "evidence-based policy making." Impact
Assessment Guidelinesfor EU Level 3 Committees (May 2007), Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/07_089.pdf.
9' Jonathan Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, ComparingRegulatory Oversight
Bodies Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
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These developments explain the increased use of consumer
testing of proposed financial disclosures and the expected future
occurrences of consumer testing. They demonstrate how a
behavioral approach necessitates greater caution in determining
the impact of regulation in abstract. The next section discusses two
examples of extensive testing efforts. I utilize these examples to
discuss how these efforts reflect the need for consumer testing but
are not designed to allow testing of what really matters for
financial disclosures-namely, that they improve consumer
decision-making.
III.EXAMPLES OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
REGULATORY TESTING
In two recent quantitative studies, proposed disclosures
were evaluated through comprehension questionnaires. In the next
section, I discuss the various issues these testing methodologies
raise, namely that comprehension questionnaires fail to measure
the relevant outcome, which is the decision made based on the
disclosure, and that the setup of the testing does not allow for
inference to real-life situations.
A. EU: Key Investor Information Document
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS)
are the European equivalent to US mutual funds; they are the
predominant type of fund that allows retail investors to pool
resources for investments that are more complicated, costly or
sometimes impossible to conduct without such pooling. In 1985 the
European Council and Parliament adopted Directive 85 /61 1/EEC,
which established UCITS as vehicles for collective investments for
retail investors. UCITS are a unique type of fund as they can be
authorized by a single Member State but operate freely throughout
the EU. Therefore, establishing such a fund was an important step
for creating a single market for financial services. UCITS are openthe US and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU, in COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 309 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2011).

For discussion of Regulatory Impact Assessments addressing concerns of sustainable development in different OECD jurisdictions, see OECD,
SUSTAINABILITY
IN IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A REVIEW OF IMPACT
ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS IN SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES AND THE EUROPEAN

COMMISSION (Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatorypolicy/Sustainability% 20in % 20impact%20assessment%20SG-SD(2011)6FINAL.pdf.
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ended funds that invest in transferable securities and are similar to
the US mutual fund but are limited in a number of ways. 12 While
the current consumer participation in the UCITS market is
narrower than US participation in mutual funds,93 the trend seems
toward broader participation in collective investment schemes in
Europe,94 requiring disclosure regimes to consider future investors
and current investors.
Similar to the regulation of mutual funds in the US,9 a
major concern with the regulation of UCITS is how to allow
consumers to- benefit from the investments in these funds while
addressing concerns regarding the protection of unsophisticated
consumers. As a means to protect investors, UCITS were initially
required to submit statutory prospectuses to the Member State
regulator, which approved the prospectus as a safeguard for
investors. The disclosure requirement was amended in 2001 as part
of a larger regulatory reform. The 2001 amendment required
UCITS to provide a simplified prospectus to investors.96 The
For example, the UCITS Directive imposes rules relating to fund diversification, liquidity and use of leverage. See Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS), O.J. OF THE EURO.
92

UNION L 302/32 (2009).

91 See for example in the US: Investment Company Institute, Worldwide
Mutual Fund Assets and Flows, Third Quarter 2011. At the time the size of the
US mutual fund industry was $12.9 trillion whereas the size of the UCITS industry was $7.3 trillion; For data on Europe see the Commission Staff Working
Document, Impact Assessment for Amendment of Directive, 2009/65/EC (2012),
§3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/investment/docs/ucits-directive/20120703-impact-assessment en.pdf, in which it suggested that based on
the statistics of six Member States 10% of EU households are invested in mutual
funds. Compare to 44% of US households that own mutual funds. See
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK

90, availableat http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf.
94 Impact Assessment Accompanying White Paperon Enhancing the Single
Market Frameworkfor Investment Funds, COM(2006) 686 Final, at 16 (Nov.
15, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/investment/docs/legal-texts/whitepaper/impact_
assessment en.pdf.
91 For the US attempt at creating a summary prospectus for mutual funds,
see SEC SUMMARY PROSPECTUS, supra note 67.
96 The actual Directive was adopted in 2001. Directive 2001/107/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 January 2002 Amending Council
Directive 85/61 1/EEC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Adminis-
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simplified prospectus, which came into full use in late 2005, was
intended to include only the key features of the fund, such as the
investment aims, fee structure and risks, in simple English for
consumers.
In 2006, two workshops about the simplified prospectus
revealed that the simplified disclosure was not serving its
purpose."' The workshops determined that the simplified
prospectus was ineffective because it was implemented differently
by Member States and often contained too much information to be
a concise document.' Information about risks, costs, and
performance was calculated and presented inconsistently making
it difficult to use the simplified prospectus and compare across
funds. 9 In general, retail investors did not easily understand the
information in the simplified prospectus and producing the
simplified prospectus was costly for UCITS. Ultimately, the
simplified disclosure was deemed to have "failed to become the
clear, concise, and meaningful information document that it was
intended to be"100 and was therefore "a regulatory failure" 1
This prompted an extensive search for an alternative to the
simplified prospectus, which led to the proposal of requiring funds
to provide a Key Investor Information Document ("KIID").1' 2 The

trative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) With a View to Regulating Management Companies
and Simplified Prospectuses, O.J. OF THE EURO. UNION L 41/20 (2002).
11 For full reports of the workshops see Key Investor Information,
EUROPEAN COMM'N, available at http://ec.europa.eulinternalmarket/investment/investorinformation!
indexen.htm.
98 Consultation Paper on Content and Form of Key Investor Information
Disclosure for UCITS 10, THE COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES
http://www.esma.europa.eu/sysavailable at
(CESR),
REGULATORS
tem/files/07_669.pdf [hereinafter CESR CONSULTATION PAPER 2007].

99See also Impact Assessment Accompanying Draft Commission Regulation
Implementing Directive, 2009/65/EC (2010) at 16, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarketinvestmentdocs/ucits-directive/1005 2 1-impact-assessment-en.pdf [hereinafter Impact Assessment 2010].
100 Simplified ProspectusWorkshops, Issues Paper,EUROPEAN COMM'N at
13 (May 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/finance/investment/docs/other-docs/prospectus/bp- 1st-sp-workshop-en.pdf.
101 CESR CONSULTATION PAPER 2007, supra note 98, at 10.
102 For the various documents related to the adoption see UCITS - Under-

takings For the Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, EUROPEAN
COMM'N,

http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/investment/ucits-directive/in-
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development of recommendations for the technical details and
definitions of this document was assigned to the European
Securities Committee and the Committee of European Securities
Regulators ("CESR"), the predecessor of European Securities and
Markets Authority ("ESMA"). °3 CESR's initial set of advice"°
used the consumer testing research of the KIID proposed format
conducted by IFF Research and YouGov. °5
The UCITS IV Directive was finally adopted in June
2009.106 In April 2010, the European Securities Committee voted

in favor of the implementing measures based on the CESR's
advice, which was accompanied by an impact assessment. 0 7 The
Commission, in July 2010, finally adopted the implementing
measures containing the details of the KIID requirement. UCITS
IV came into effect on July 1, 2012.0

dexen.htm. The regulatory process leading to the adoption of the KIID is extensive including many stages such as bilateral informal meetings with stakeholders, studies, expert groups, open hearings, public consultations, workshops
and impact assessments as well as multiple level rule making.
103 See Lamfalussy Report, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/securities/lamfalussy/reportindexen.htm.
104 In 2007 the Commission submitted a request for assistance to CESR in
developing the implementing measures of the KIID. CESR then engaged in a
number of rounds of consultation papers and comments, eventually producing
its initial advice.
105 IFF RESEARCH & YouGov, UCITS DISCLOSURE TESTING RESEARCH
REPORT (2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/investment/docs/otherdocs/research-report en.pdf [hereinafter KIID DISCLOSURE
RESEARCH REPORT].

106 Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities
Directive 85/611/EEC of 20 December 1985 amended, inter alia, by Directives
2001/107/EC ("Management company Directive") of 21 January 2002 and
2001/108/EC ("Product Directive") of 21 January 2002 (UCITS III directives).
UCITS IV included many aspects of which the adoption of the KIID was only
one. An important part of the adoption process was the impact assessment,
which discussed core issues, such as whether the KIID should prioritize harmonization and standardization over flexibility. See Commission Staff Working
Document Accompanying the Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, SEC(2008) 2263 (2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/investment/docs/ucits-directive/ia report-en.pdf
[hereinafter Impact Assessment 2008]. Impact Assessment 2010 dealt with Level
2. Impact Assessment 2010, supra note 99. In addition, not all Level 2 issues were
considered in depth. Id. The issue of consumer response to KIID was considered.
107 Impact Assessment 2010, supra note 99 (dealing with Level 2 regulation).
Ill The advice on the content of the KIID was later supplemented with
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1. Methodology of Testing

A major criticism of the simplified prospectus (the
disclosure requirement prior to the adoption of the KIID) was that
the Commission did not carry out a detailed analysis of alternative
regulatory tools and the expected effect of the proposed regulation.
In one discussion of the failure of the simplified prospectus, the
Commission points out that the disclosure document was
developed without consumer testing of the document. Therefore,
the document lacked evidence that the information in the
simplified prospectus was information that consumers needed or
understood.'0 9 The need to carefully consider the impact of
regulation and consider alternatives is more than apparent in the
hundreds of pages of assessments and reports produced by the
various European institutions.
The study by IFF Research and YouGov was intended to
determine which standardized format of the KIID would be most
comprehensible to consumers. The five elements of the KIID tested
were: 1) strategy and objectives; 2) risk and reward profile; 3) past
performance; 4) charges; and 5) additional information. Unlike the
CFPB's testing, discussed below, the KIID testing was not meant
to determine whether the KIID performed better than the
simplified prospectus, but rather to test different potential KIID
formats.
The Study was designed to provide information on
consumer preferences as well as information regarding consumers'
comprehension of information in the KIID. 1" The study included
a variety of research methods such as online testing, telephone
interviews and focus groups. In addition to quantitative research
that involved online testing of consumers," 1 the study included a
technical advice regarding the calculation of the synthetic risk and reward indicator, discussed below, and the calculation of ongoing charges. See Guideline on
the Methodologyfor the Calculationof the Synthetic Risk and Reward Indicator
in the Key Investor Information Document, CESR/10-673 (2010), available at
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/10-673.pdf [hereinafter Risk Indicator

CalculationGuidelines]; Guideline on the Methodology for Calculationof Ongoing Charges Figurein the Key Investor Information Document, CESRI10-674
(2010), available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/10_674.pdf.
109 Impact Assessment 2010, supra note 99, at 133.
110CESR CONSULTATION PAPER 2007, supra note 98, at 54.

I" For a more detailed description of the study see KIHD DISCLOSURE
RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 105, at 6.
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qualitative stage in which various consumers and intermediaries
were interviewed. The quantitative study, on which I focus, was
divided into two phases. The first stage explored presentation
options for individual key elements of the KIID with over 500
participants from each of the 7 member states that were included
in the study. Disclosure presentations that were more successful
were combined into two variants of KIID, which were then tested
in the second stage with 600 participants from each of the 7
member states. The study took place online. Participants were
divided into two groups, each receiving one of the two KIID
variants for two mock UCITS funds. One of the funds was an
Emerging Market Fund while the other was an Absolute Return
Fund with a lower risk profile.
Participants were then asked questions about the content of
the documents. Many of the questions related to information in the
KIID or questions that required basic interpretation. For example,
participants were asked whether it is true or false that "[b]ecause
the fund invests in bonds 40% of my capital is protected whatever
happens".11 Other questions focused on the comparison between
the two types of funds. For example, participants were asked to
choose for which of the two funds was it more likely to receive
much less than originally invested' 13 and to select the fund with the
higher ongoing charge." 4 Thus, the study compared the answers
between each group of participants to reveal the variant for which
participants were able to provide more accurate answers.
2. Testing Results
The Commission

used three dimensions to evaluate

112 This question was on the "Strategy and Objectives" part of the mock
KIID of an Emerging Market Fund. Other questions include whether it is true
or false that "The fund can invest in bonds from any country" and "The majority
of the fund's assets must be invested in stocks but the remaining part may be
invested in bonds." See id. at 42. For the Absolute Return Fund, participants
were asked questions like whether the statements "The fund intends to lessen
the effects of sharp rises and falls in value" and "The value of the fund will
closely follow market trends" were true or false. See id. at 46.
113 See id. at 54. Participants were also asked to select which
of the two
funds has the "greater chance of achieving a more stable growth without too
many sharp ups or downs".
114 See id. at 112. Other questions include selecting the fund that "incurs
additional charges if the fund achieves its objective". For a full list of questions
see id.
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information in the KIID. The first dimension was whether the
information is engaging and this dimension was closely related to
consumer preferences.1 5 The second dimension was whether retail
investors understood information. The last dimension was
whether information was presented in a way that facilitates
comparison with other funds.
While results varied across categories and question types,
overall comprehension levels were not very high. A high
percentage of participants (around 15 %-20%) responded, "don't
the mean of correct
know," to questions. In some categories
16
questions.
5
of
out
1.4
was
answers
The purpose of using a full mock-up KIID was to allow the
study to test overall interaction with the document. When asked
what section participants would pay the "most attention" to, the
risk and reward section was of most interest followed by the
Objectives and Investment Strategy section. Only 7% would pay
"most attention" to the charges section. When asked what section
was easiest to understand, participants were "most likely" to select
the past performance section and "least likely" to select the
Additional Information and charges sections. Many participants
also selected the charges section as the hardest to understand
particularly with regards to the variant containing the illustration
of charges.
The study's report carefully concludes that the proposed
KIID promotes consumer understanding. However, the study is
interpreted and summarized in a way that lacks nuance in the
Commission's Impact Assessment of the UCITS IV implementing
measures: "Research shows that standardisation in content and
presentation of information aids investors in comparing between
funds and, if standardisation focuses on delivery of key
information in an investor-friendly manner, it can aid
comprehension of messages and engagement with disclosures.""' 7
Ultimately, the scope of the quantitative study is quite narrow. The
qualitative stage of the study involved comparison of KIID to presales information available at the time. However, the quantitative
stage was restricted to comparing proposed KIID formats.
"I The wording of the Commission is "is the information presented so as to
engage with retail investors?" Impact Assessment 2010, supra note 99, at 132.
116 KIID DISCLOSURE RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 105, at 36.
"I Impact Assessment 2010, supra note 99, at 17.
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Broader inferences may be made from the European study
on the use of disclosure. The disclosure presentations tested in the
study follow many of the insights suggested by authors as to when
disclosure might be effective. The disclosure presentations are
written in simplified and plain English"" and it is a standardized
document that facilitates comparison." 9 In one variant, it used a
scale to present risk, 2 ' and it presented costs using a specific
illustration. 2 ' Despite the incorporation of many guidelines as to
how to create effective disclosures, comprehension levels were low.
3.

Subsequent Experiments

Following the adoption of the KIID, an online experiment
sought to test its effectiveness in meeting its regulatory goals.'2 2 In
the experiment, 137 participants were randomly divided into a
treatment group receiving the KIID and a control group receiving
the full prospectus. Participants were first asked to evaluate the
23
documents, in which the KIID was perceived as of better quality.1
Participants were then asked to make a hypothetical investment
decision on an endowment of E10,000 for an investment horizon of
15-20 years. The amount invested in the risk fee asset was similar
for the group receiving the KIID and the group receiving the full
prospectus. However, the treatment group receiving the KIID was
less likely to engage in naive diversification1 24 of dividing assets
125
equally amongst offered funds.
118

On simplification of disclosure, see Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman,

supra note 49, at 21; FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 2011, supra note 12, at 10;
Willis, supra note 2, at 821. See study and conclusions of FTC REPORT 2007,
supra note 69."9 Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 49, at 22.
120 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 2011, supra note 12, at 12.
121

Id. at 15.

122

Torsten Walther, Key Investor Documents and Their Consequences on

Investment Behavior, 85 J. BUS. ECON. 129 (2014).
123 On all ten aspects of quality, including comprehensibility and helpfulness, the KIID was perceived as of better quality. However, half the subjects
receiving the KIID state that they are unable to understand the information.
The study also showed that those receiving the KIID are far less likely to claim
that the document contains too much information. Id. at 8.
124 Shlomo Benartzi & Richard Thaler, Naive DiversificationStrategies in
Defined ContributionSavings Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79 (2001).
125 The author suggests that the lack of information overload for participants receiving the KIID decreases the probability of naive diversification, however makes no additional evaluation of investment decisions. For example, it is
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The study provides an important extension to the EU study
in that it tests the KIID relative to the full prospectus, thereby
comparing the new regulatory regime to the existing full
prospectus. However, a more appropriate comparison would be
between the KIID and the simplified prospectus, the previously
existing regulatory regime.
Moreover, the study appears to have limited value in
developing out understanding of the impact of KIID. Firstly, the
extent to which the subjective comprehensibility of a document is
correlated with the objective ability to understand a document is
unclear. Therefore, the experiment's focus on subjective
dimensions is possibly of little importance to broader issues of
consumer protection. Secondly, the experiment does not address
other aspects of investment decisions beyond naive diversification.
In another study by Oehler et al.,126 finance students were
surveyed regarding the benefits of the KIID.'2 7 The study found
that students deemed the KIID developed by the researchers,
called the "neutral benchmark" KIID, more effective than KIDs
developed by suppliers and issuers.
The next section discusses the various methodological
concerns raised by the testing of the KIID.
B. US: CFPB Testing of Mortgage Disclosure
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB). The CFPB was directed to propose rules and disclosures
combining the disclosures under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
unclear whether those that did not engage in naive diversification underutilized
the opportunity to diversify their portfolio, and so it is possible those receiving
the KIID made worse investment decisions. Walther, supra note 122, at 15.
126 Andreas Oehler, Andreas Hofer & Stefan Wendt, Do Key Investor Information Documents Enhance Retail Investors' Understanding of Financial
Products? Empirical Evidence, J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE [forthcoming
2015].

127 The choice to have finance students surveyed was because the researchers considered them knowledgeable enough to assess financial documents. Id. at
8. However, it is not clear how to generalize the assessments of finance students
to all consumers. For example, data that may be considered more accurate to a
finance student may be confusing to a consumer.
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and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).12 8
TILA was enacted in 1968 and was meant to provide
consumers with awareness of the cost of credit, including
mortgages.'2 9 TILA requires, among other things, that consumers
receive disclosure of credit terms within three days of applying for
a mortgage loan. If certain terms change, another disclosure is
required three days before closing. RESPA was enacted in 1974 to
provide disclosure of settlement charges. 3 ° RESPA requires that
consumers receive a Good Faith Estimate (GFE) of the closing
costs also within three days of an application for a mortgage and
that they receive a uniform settlement statement at closing (HUD1). In 1996, Congress directed the Federal Reserve Board, in
charge of implementing TILA, and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), in charge of implementing
RESPA, to create a single disclosure fulfilling the requirements of
both Acts. After identifying the problems with the existing
disclosures,'
they sought to address the issues through
implementing regulations. In 2010, the responsibility to create an
integrated disclosure was transferred to the CFPB with the
passage of Dodd-Frank.
To develop a proposal for the new integrated disclosures,
the CFPB embarked on an extensive project in 2011. The CFPB's
Mortgage Disclosure Project involved contracting with a
professional research company to test the different types of
mortgage disclosures. The report on the qualitative stage was
published in July 2012.132 Following the qualitative study, the
CFPB proposed an integrated disclosure to be provided after
consumers apply for the mortgage (the Loan Estimate), replacing
the initial TILA disclosure and GFE, and an integrated disclosure
to be provided before the loan closing (the Closing Disclosure),
replacing the final TILA disclosure and the HUD-1 under RESPA.
128

§§ 1098, 1100A of Dodd-Frank.

15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2015). For a critical analysis of the adoption process
of TILA see Rubin, supra note 44, at 242.
130 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a), (b)(1) (2015).
' ' See, e.g., Jinkook Lee & Jeanne Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers' Understandingof APRs and Contract Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL'Y &
129

MARKETING 66 (1999).
132 CONSUMER
FIN.

PROT. BUREAU,

KNOW

BEFORE

YOU

OWE:

(July 9, 2012),
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207-cfpb-report-tila-respaEVOLUTION OF THE INTEGRATED TILA-RESPA DISCLOSURES

testing.pdf.
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In its quantitative study, the CFPB used the proposal of the new
integrated disclosures to validate their effectiveness and to
compare their performance to the previously existing disclosures.
My analysis focuses on the quantitative stage, the report of which
was published in November 2013, although many of my comments
also refer to the qualitative stage. 33
The CFPB's Mortgage Disclosure Project stated that its
three main objectives are to create disclosures that: 1) are
comprehensible so that consumers know the basic terms of the loan
and its cost, 2) facilitate comparison, and 3) as a result of consumers
comprehending the disclosure and comparing disclosures, allow
them to make informed decisions. The efforts eventually produced
a 3-page document replacing longer and overlapping disclosures.
The CFPB's disclosure project reflects an attempt at robust
empirical testing of disclosure materials before their adoption and
would seem like the ultimate application of the notion of evidencebased regulation. It seems unlikely that the resources and time
investment in developing the integrated disclosures will be applied
frequently in the future process of adopting regulation. However,
it is clear that the case of mortgage disclosure is meant to be a
proto-type of what robust evidence of the effectiveness of
regulation is meant to look like.
1. Methodology of Testing
The quantitative testing compared the previously
mandated disclosures with the disclosures proposed after the
qualitative testing was completed in 2012. The study used a
controlled experiment to assess understanding with a betweensubjects factorial design. The disclosures presented to subjects
varied along 3 different categories: (1) disclosure type
(proposed/current); (2) loan type (fixed rate/adjustable rate); and (3)
complexity of loan (easy/more challenging - such as loans with
negative amortization and interest only loans).
The experiment also included two types of consumers; half
of the subjects were experienced consumers while the other half
133

For the full report see, Know Before You Owe, Quantitative Study,

xiv,
http://files.consumat
BUREAU,
PROT.
FIN.
CONSUMER
erfinance.gov/f/2 013 1 lcfpb-study-tila-respadisclosure-comparison.pdf
[hereinafter CFPB MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY].
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were inexperienced consumers. A total of 858 participated in the
study in 20 different locations.
Each subject received initial and final disclosures and was
then asked 48 questions. The session in which subjects participated
was divided into several parts, each part containing a different
task, such as comparing the terms of two initial disclosures or
comparing an initial and final disclosure. In each part, subjects
received a questionnaire related to the disclosures.
Participants were asked standard comprehension questions
relating either to the understanding of a specific document or to
the comparison of two documents. For example, participants were
asked: "How much principal will you pay in 5 years?" (question
24), "How does APR compare?" (question 7) and "Does this loan
have mortgage insurance?" (question 25). 114
The CFPB identified nine different financial concepts that
they considered essential for informed consumers, which they
tested through various questions. The accuracy of the answers to
the questions was then compared between subjects receiving the
former disclosures and the proposed disclosures.
Task 1 of the study was different than the comprehension
questions presented as part of the other tasks. For Task 1, subjects
were presented with their initial disclosures and asked to choose
between two mortgages and justify their choice. The analysis
focused on subjects' ability to articulate their choice. The CFPB
considered the fulfillment of the task based on the number of
comments. In the words of the study itself, Task 1 was "not the
central focus of our analyses".135
2. Results
In analyzing the results, the CFPB cuts the information in
various ways including groupings along parts, tasks and concepts
with varying results. According to most data analyses, the
percentage of subjects receiving the proposed disclosures who
answered correctly is 16 percentage points more than those
receiving the current (now former) disclosures.

134 For a full list of questions, see id. at Appendix C.
135 Id. at xiv.
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Using the index that includes all 39 core questions
according to the CFPB, 3 6 59.3% of those that received the current
disclosure answered correctly while 76.2% who received the
proposed disclosures answered correctly. Similar to the European
testing, the CFPB does not provide guidelines as to how to
evaluate its results. The CFPB concludes in the CBA in its Final
Rule: "Since the Bureau's quantitative testing revealed that the
Loan Estimate is substantially more understandable for consumers
than the current early TILA disclosure and RESPA GFE, the
Bureau therefore believes that the new form will enable consumers
to make more informed choices when they are considering a
137
mortgage."
IV. CONCERNS WITH THE WAY DISCLOSURES
ARE TESTED
Despite the resources invested in consumer financial
disclosure testing in the US and Europe, their methodology and
results raise several concerns. The structure of the tests is at odds
with the regulators' stated purpose of financial disclosures.
Moreover, the adoption of financial disclosures based on seemingly
poor comprehension levels raises questions as to the goal of
disclosures.
In this section, I will discuss the various concerns with
current testing methodologies. I first discuss how the structure of
consumer testing in experimental and isolated conditions question
the external validity of the testing results. I then discuss the issue
of internal validity and suggest that the current use of
comprehension tests fails to test what regulators are concerned
about, namely improved consumer decision-making. Furthermore,
comprehension tests fail to capture potential benefits of disclosures
that fall short of full comprehension.
3I The core questions include all the questions other than Task 1 (choosing
among two different loans) and excluding question 42 ("Do you have any comments about the final loan terms and costs?") and questions 43-48 that were scale
rating questions about the disclosures. For the reasons they were excluded, see
id. at 39, note 21.
131 Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act (Regulation X) and the Truth In Lending Act (Regulation Z), Final
Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 79730, 80079 (Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter IntegratedMortgage
Disclosure FinalRule].
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In the next section, I discuss several ways in which to
improve regulatory testing, addressing the concerns raised.
A. Missing Benchmarksfor Evaluation
Both the CFPB and EU tests do not provide a benchmark
for the required level of comprehension needed to justify the
adoption of the proposed disclosures. One aspect in which the
KIID and RESPA-TILA testing differ is what their tests are
comparing. The EU tests different potential variants for the new
disclosure, while the CFPB tests comprehension of the proposed
disclosure relative to the existing disclosures. Since the CFPB and
EU do not explicitly state the level of comprehension needed for
the adoption of regulation, it is possibly the mere fact that the
adopted disclosure performed better, even if only marginally.
However, the lack of a defined and justified benchmark
seems problematic given the overall low levels of comprehension.
While the final KIID format contained elements that were deemed
superior by the study, overall levels of accurate answers were low
in many cases, including for questions essential for informed
investments. In the past performance, category participants
exposed to the presentation of information over a 10-year period
did slightly better in the study than those exposed to a 5-year
period bar graph. In general, however, the level of understanding
was not high. For example, the mean of correct answers was 1.5
out of 5 questions on the understanding of the Emerging Market
Fund mock KIID graph."I Another issue was that a large number
of participants answered "don't know" (around 15%-20%).139 For

example, only 35 % of participants correctly answered whether the
following statement is true or false: "If you had invested in 2005,
the fund would not have achieved its growth objective by the end
of 2006" is true or false. a0 45% of participants who were asked to
138

KIID DISCLOSURE RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 105, at 93. This is

true for the variant select- 10-year period bar graph. The mean was even lower
for the 5-year period graph.
139 Id. at 107. The questions in this section focused on the understanding of
the past performance graphs, such as asking whether the statement "If you had
invested in 2005, the fund would not have achieved its growth objective by the
end of 2006" is true or false (only 35% of participants answered this question
correctly, see id. at 99), or the comparison of two funds, such as asking which of
two funds is more likely to have positive performance over the next three years.
Id. at 104.
140 Id. at 99.
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compare two funds' past performance and determine which of two
funds is more likely to have positive performance over the next
three years, correctly answered "neither". 141
For the charges and costs category, subjects either received
a mock KIID with charges presented only in the form of a table,
showing charges as percentages, or received a mock KIID that also
included an illustration of the charges for a 10,000 euros
investment over a period of 1, 5 and 10 years assuming an annual
growth of 5%. The findings of the study were that consumers
preferred to receive the variant with the illustration of charges but
found it difficult to use the information to estimate charges. 42
Participants were particularly confused regarding entry fees and
their impact on an investment. 143 For example, over 40% cannot
accurately answer which of two funds had a higher entry charge,
and over 50% cannot accurately answer which fund is likely to
have the higher level of transaction costs, 14 4 key factors directly
effecting investment returns. Similar to the interpretation of the
past performance information, there was consistently a high
percentage of participants (around 15%-20%) who responded,
"don't know" to questions.
In general, superiority of one variant over another was
primarily on the dimension of engagement. In other words,
participants often preferred one variant to another even though
there were no significant differences in comprehension levels. For
example, in the risk category, the study concluded that the overall
understanding was similar for a narrative description of the risks
and a synthetic risk indicator, however consumers preferred the
synthetic indicator.1 45 Although it may seem inconsequential
whether consumers prefer a document when it does not promote
understanding, the authors of the study suggest that engagement
is important in real world contexts in determining whether
46
consumers attempt to even read the disclosure.
Ultimately, the EU study seems to support the variant that
performed better. However, it is unclear why a better performing
141
142
143
144
145
146
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mock variant in a particular test is the criteria for adopting a
disclosure format, rather than, for example, further developing
more effective disclosures.
Regarding the CFPB's results, they seem grim in terms of
the expectation that consumers understand the disclosures, or that
they be fully informed. As mentioned above, the percentage of
questions answered correctly by participants receiving the
proposed disclosure was 76.2 %, which seems quite low given that
it includes both experienced and inexperienced subjects. More
importantly, this average seems to be driven by some questions in
which participants score particularly high. Many of these
questions merely required subjects to copy information clearly
labeled in the disclosure. For example, 99.1% of those receiving the
proposed disclosure answered the question "What is the loan
amount?" correctly; 147 the disclosure contained a large rubric at the
top labeled "Loan Amount".
In many cases the percentage of people answering the
question correctly, even when presented with the proposed
disclosures, remains low. 14 For example, question 22 asked
subjects "Do you have a penalty if you want to refinance?", an
important aspect of a mortgage loan. Only 54.9% of subjects
answered correctly, an increase of 1.6 percentage points from the
percentage of those receiving the current disclosure that answered
correctly.14 9
The percentage point difference between the proposed and
existing disclosure was 16.9%,15 ° however this may be overstating
the effect of the proposed disclosure. Partially, this is driven by
abnormally high differences for particular questions. For example,
participants were asked, "How much is the first monthly payment
for mortgage insurance?",15 1 with only 2.3% of those receiving the
existing disclosures answering correctly and 65.1% of those
147

CFPB MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 133, at Question 11.

See also id. at Appendix C, H.
148 See for example question 18: "When you make your first total monthly
payment, for how much will you write the check?" Interestingly this question
slightly breaks the cycle of asking people to copy information that can be identified by the heading in the disclosure, as it makes the connection between the
information in the disclosure and an actual action. Id.
149 See id. at Appendix C for full list of questions.
Io

Id. at 41.

151

Id. at Question 26.
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receiving the proposed disclosure answering correctly. This is less
striking when considering that the proposed disclosures had a
separate amount titled "Mortgage Insurance", whereas the existing
disclosures simply provided one amount titled "Taxes and
Insurance" noting below "Includes Private Mortgage Insurance."
Furthermore, for over 40% of the questions, the percentage point
difference was under 10%. s2 For some questions, the percentage
disclosures was
of those answering correctly with the proposed
15 3
lower than those with current disclosure.
While the CFPB seems pleased with its own results, they
too do not provide a criterion to judge whether the improvement
in results justifies the adoption of the proposed disclosures. It
would seem that any increase, for at least most of the questions
would qualify as a "success." With such a low threshold for success
it is hard to imagine a scenario in which the study does not confirm
the CFPB's belief that the proposed disclosures should be adopted,
particularly considering the type of questions the CFPB asked.
B. Isolated Environment
Current testing practices raise several concerns regarding
their generalizability, raising the question of whether their results
can be extrapolated to real-life situations.
One way in which comprehension tests may not lead to
improved financial decisions in the real world relates to the
controlled environments in which the testing takes place. This
controlled environment where people are isolated from
distractions and focus on the task at hand can differ greatly from
the real life context of exposure to financial disclosures,
questioning the external validity of the testing results.
For example, in the case of mortgage disclosure, the
CFPB's project was focused on creating a concise disclosure
fulfilling the requirements of TILA and RESPA, which was
subsequently tested. However, real-life mortgage transactions
152

See for example, question 30 on the interest rate in year 1: "How do the

application disclosures and the final disclosures compare in terms of the interest
rate in year 1?" Id. at Question 30.
151 See for example, question 16 on Settlement Charges: "How much are
your estimated settlement charges?" for which there was a decrease of 39.9%.
Id. at Question 16.
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often involve many other disclosures mandated by state
legislatures, municipal law and courts as well as other documents
presented to consumers at the time of signing a mortgage
agreement. Ben Shahar and Schneider suggest that mortgage
transactions can be accompanied by as many as fifty separate
disclosures. 15 4 These documents may include documents regarding
"the loans tax consequences; the property appraisal; the lender's
credit reporting practices; agents' conflicts of interest; the right to
cancel the transaction; compliance with non-discrimination
statutes; privacy and data collection; payment options; escrow
choices; and much more".'5 5 The amount of disclosures may dwarf
the impact of the TILA and RESPA disclosure, and therefore the
context in which participants answer comprehension questions
about their mortgage based on one document seems at odds with
the real life context in which consumers receive the integrated
disclosure. A major focus of the effort to create an integrated
disclosure was to allow key information to be easily identified by
consumers.'5 6 However, even if consumers can identify the key
information when presented with the integrated disclosures in the
experimental context, there is little reason to believe this will also
be the case when the integrated disclosure is one of fifty
documents.
Another way the testing fails to reflect the real life context
of financial disclosures is through the lack of human interaction in
the testing. In many of the contexts where consumers receive
disclosures, they are also interacting with financial advisors or
brokers, so that the real life impact of disclosure depends on its
interaction with other factors competing with consumer's
attention, like human communication. The presence of a broker
will often override what a consumer reads in a disclosure, or make
the consumer believe they do not need to read the disclosure, as the
broker provides the essential information.'5 7 Despite frequent
114

Futility of CBA, supra note 42, at 12. See also Willis, supra note 2, at

790.
"I' Futility of CBA, supra note 42, at 13.
156 CFPB MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 133, at xv.

Willis, supra note 2, at 798; Debra Pogrand Stark, Jessica M. Choplin &
Mark A. Leoboeuf, Ineffective in Any Form: How Confirmation Bias and Distractions Undermine Improved Home-Loan Disclosures, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE
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(2013),

available

at

http://canhr.org/abuse/PDFs/YLJ-onineffectivedisclosures.pdf;
Financial
Services Authority Key Facts Quick Guide: Research Findings. FinancialServices Authority, CONSUMER RESEARCH 41 (July 2005); Debra Stark & Jessica
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misalignment of the brokers' and consumers' incentives,
consumers often misunderstand this conflict of interest and are
motivated to trust brokers." 8 The testing design of the CFPB and
the EU does not include this aspect and therefore is far from
reflecting real-life impact.
In 2008 the Federal Reserve Board considered the broader
impact of disclosures combined with the interaction with a broker,
rather than the narrow effect of disclosure alone. The Federal
Reserve Board tested its proposed amendments to Regulation Z
that would prohibit creditors paying mortgage brokers unless
certain information regarding the broker's compensation was
disclosed." 9 One element of the disclosure addresses the possibility
that brokers offer consumers loans that are not in their interest
given the payment structure. Cognitive interviews were used to
test whether consumers understood this potential conflict of
interest. Interviewees were asked "to imagine that they had met
with a broker who had given them this agreement to read and
sign". 16 Although this is an interesting attempt to have
participants consider the situation in which they receive the
disclosure, it is surprising that the interviews only looked at the
impact of the document itself given how the broker-consumer
relationship is built on human interaction.
The real life circumstances in which consumers receive
financial disclosures include other distractions, beyond other
disclosures and human interaction that compete for consumers'
attention. Although it is difficult to replicate such distractions in
an experimental context, some studies have created an
environment with distractions, such as distractions created by
television. 16 1 Some experiments have engaged participants viewing
Choplin, A Cognitive and Social PsychologicalAnalysis of DisclosureLaws and
Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCH. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 85 (2010).
158 Stark & Choplin, supra note 157; Roman Inderst & Macro Ottaviani,
FinancialAdvice, 50 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 494 (2012); Sunita Sah, George
Loewenstein &Daylian Cain, The Burden of Disclosure: Increased Compliance
with DistrustedAdvice, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.: INTERPERSONAL
REL. & GRP. PROCESSES 289 (2013).
"I FED. RES. BD., SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: CONSUMER TESTING OF
http://www.federalre(2008),
DISCLOSURES
BROKER
MORTGAGE

serve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/2 00807 14regzconstest.pdf.
160 Id. at i.
161 Georganne

Ylias & Patrick Heaven, The Influence of Distraction on
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disclosures in distracting conversation, showing that they are less
62
likely to overcome confirmation bias.1
C. Experiment Effects
Concerns regarding external validity, which relates to the
ability to infer from the experimental results to other relevant
settings, are partially recognized in reports of regulatory testing.
The EU report explains, for example, that:
"It is important to appreciate that all of our testing
is subject to a research effect in that our
respondents read the documents put in front of
them because that is what they had been recruited
for and agreed to do. It would be a mistake to
assume that in reality all respondents would
actually read the documents. Therefore any
document testing in a research environment can
'
be regarded as a "best-case" scenario."163
This seems to be of particular concern with financial disclosures,
given the increasing amount of evidence that people do not read
them at all.'6 4 While every experiment may involve some tradeoff
between the complexity of the experiment and the ability to
extrapolate conclusions from it, the next section provides ways in
which regulatory testing can become more accurate.
It is important to note that some concerns with regulatory
testing may push in the opposite direction - people may
underperform as they lack appropriate incentives. Both the CFPB
and EU study provided compensation for participating in the
study but no monetary incentives for answering questions
Reading Comprehension:A Big Five Analysis, 34 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 1069 (2003).

162 Stark, Choplin & LaBoeuf, supra note 157. According to the authors,
confirmation bias in this context means "cognitive biases wherein the individuals skim through documents seeking to confirm the truth of what they were
told ... and fail to skim for evidence that a statement is false". Id. at 379.
163

KIID DISCLOSURE RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 105, at 152.

164

See supra section [the parts above that discuss failures of disclosure] of

recent research on disclosure. See also MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW,

supra note 7. In the online contract context see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler,
Some Realities of Online Contracting, 19 SUPREME COURT ECON. REV. 11
(2011).
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accurately. If comprehending disclosures requires cognitive effort
we would expect more effort to be invested when provided an
incentive to answer correctly. While in the context of a study,
people may lack incentives. In real life, people may face potentially
significant gains and losses when selecting a mutual fund to invest
in or a low cost mortgage. Therefore, it is possible that real-life
comprehension of disclosure documents may be higher than in
regulatory studies.
While there might be some justification in designing studies
so that they provide incentives to answer questions correctly, it is
important to not overstate this concern. Firstly, it has been
repeatedly shown that even when faced with significant financial
stakes, people are sometimes reluctant to invest minimal cognitive
effort, such as reading short disclosure documents. 165 Moreover,
the extent to which providing performance based financial
rewards, the standard practice for experimental economists, alters
to invest in responding to surveys has been
people's willingness 166
debated extensively.
D. Question Answering Format
The concerns raised in the previous section relate to the
generalizability of testing disclosure materials in certain
experimental settings. However, the specific format used by the
CFPB and the EU in their testing raises additional concerns. As
discussed in Part II, the CFPB and EU both test financial
disclosures through questionnaires related to the content of the
documents. The KIID study report never explicitly justifies its
See supra Part II.A. and supra note 63.
See, e.g., Vernon Smith & James Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Costs in Experimental Economics, 31 EcoN. INQUIRY 245 (1993); Colin
Camerer & Robin Hogarth, The Effects of FinancialIncentives in Experiments:
A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999) (summarizing the results of 74 studies showing that financial incentives matter in some cases and not in others). See also Kathrin
Pokorny, Pay-But Do Not Pay Too Much: An ExperimentalStudy on the Impact of Incentives, 66 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 251 (2008).
More generally, researchers have raised myriad reasons that lab results are not
generalizable. See, e.g., Steven Levitt & John List, What Do LaboratoryExperiments MeasuringSocial PreferencesReveal About the Real World?, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 153 (2007). On the possible importance of financial incentives, see
Ondrej Rydval & Andreas Ortmann, How FinancialIncentives and Cognitive
Abilities Affect Task Performance in Laboratory Settings: An Illustration, 85
165

166

ECON. LETTERS 315 (2004).
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decision to focus on comprehension despite the stated purpose of
the disclosure to improve consumer decision-making and
competition between funds. Similar to the European testing, the
CFPB focuses its study on consumer comprehension when its
stated purpose of financial disclosures is to help people make the
best personal decisions that they believe are best and to insure
"more knowledgeable choices".'67 The CFPB does not explain why
it chose not to test whether the financial disclosures allow
consumers to make better decisions. The CFPB simply focused on
comprehension. This is problematic for several reasons.
1. Saliency
First, an important aspect of consumers being able to use
disclosures in a meaningful way relates to whether information is
salient to them. In other words, people need to, first of all, notice
important information in order to understand and then use the
information. Research on financial disclosures has revealed that a
primary concern is that people often fail to recognize important
information, clearly a required stage for understanding the
information. 16 If this is a major concern with financial disclosures,
then the regulators should also test whether people notice
important information. However, the format of asking
comprehension questions somewhat undermines that inquiry,
since the questions themselves focus people's attention.169 In a reallife context, people look over documents and make decisions,
rather than being asked comprehension questions that shape their
attention.
For example, in regards to mortgage disclosures, an
important issue is whether consumers, when looking at the
disclosures, notice if the loan has mortgage insurance. When
subjects are explicitly asked whether the loan has mortgage
CFPB MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 133, at xvi.
168 Knowing how to identify the important information in a disclosure may
be a significant barrier to the effectiveness of a disclosure. This has led to a number of proposals to have disclosure focus on information that corrects misperceptions. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts,
92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008). See also Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading
Problem in ConsumerContract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014) (discussing the
proposal to have disclosure focus on unfavorable terms).
169 In both studies, subjects answered questions when they had the disclosures in front of them. In other words, participants were not asked to recall information they had previously observed.
167
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insurance (question 25),170 it clearly increases the chance that
consumers will look for the mortgage insurance rubric, as this
information becomes important and therefore salient. However,
we do not know whether the consumer would notice this
information absent the question. As the CFPB study is designed
primarily around asking subjects specific questions, the study by
definition skews the saliency of information.
In the context of mutual funds, Choi et al. 7' indicates that
people overlook fees. In many cases people cannot recall looking at
the fees of a fund, let alone remember what the fees were. Looking
to the way the EU tested the KIID, it is clear that by asking
participants to compare fees among funds, it encourages
participants to look at the fees. In other words, the European
Commission's results may indicate that a certain percentage of
people correctly answer questions about fees when asked, but tells
us little about what people will know when they read the KIID and
are not prompted by questions.
2. Comprehension Tests as "Under-Conclusive"
The regulation of consumer finance through disclosure
relies crucially on people using disclosures to improve decisions.
For example, the requirement that conflicts of interest be disclosed
is based on the assumption that once these conflicts are known to
people they will be able to accurately evaluate advice they receive
given the advisor's incentives. This means that even if people
understand the basic content of the disclosure, if they under-react
or over-react to the conflict of interest, they may make distorted
decisions.'72
Therefore, people may pass comprehensibility tests
regarding disclosures, however, the disclosure does not necessarily
170
171

CFPB MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 133, at 22.
James Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte Madrian, Why Does the Law of

One Price Fail?An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds, 23:4 REV. FIN. STUD.
1405, 1432 (2010).
172 For an experiment that tests this very question, see Daylian Cain,
George Loewenstein & Don Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean:PerverseEffects
of Disclosing Conflicts of interest,34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005). For an additional
perspective on the difference between conceptual financial knowledge and financial competence as related to welfare, see Sandro Ambuehl, Douglas Bernheim & Annamaria Lusardi, FinancialEducation, FinancialCompetence and
Consumer Welfare (NBER, Working Paper No. 20618, 2014).
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improve their financial decisions. Of course, one needs to clarify
what is meant by "understanding" information, but having a thin
notion of comprehension, one that focuses on the ability to answer
questions on information that is clearly stated in the disclosure
material, does not mean a person is better able to make a financial
decision. This is because for comprehension to lead to better
decisions more knowledge is required than understanding
individual components of the disclosure. Making decisions
requires processing information initially comprehended at face
level, meaning that comprehending information does not
automatically
lead to
better
decisions, and
therefore
comprehension tests are "under-conclusive" relative to what is
expected of disclosure.
I discuss three ways in which information is processed in
order to reach a decision, all of which are overlooked by the current
testing focused on comprehension.
Firstly, replicating information in the disclosure, the focus
of many testing questions, does not necessarily reflect
understanding. Second, even when disclosures are comprehended,
it is the relative importance of different types of information
contained in the disclosure that have significant impact on the
quality of the final decision. As financial disclosures tend to
contain myriad types of information, this issue is central to
whether the disclosure helps people improve their decisions. Third,
translating information into a decision requires understanding
how the information applies to the individual, given their
circumstances and preferences.
Understanding Financial Concepts: Current testing focuses
primarily on replicating information in the disclosure without
necessarily understanding this information. This is often the case
when comprehension tests ask questions regarding financial
concepts, when actually understanding these concepts is not
required for a correct answer.
This is particularly stark in the case of the CFPB testing
where the wording of many questions is identical to the disclosure
itself. For example, question 19 asks "Which of the following
settlements services, if any, can you shop for?" and then lists a
number of services. The proposed disclosure contains a bolded
heading "Services you can shop for" under which there is a list of
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services. Therefore, a participant in the CFPB's study can easily
answer this question correctly 7 3 without knowing what the
various services are or even what shopping for services means. 174
A similar issue exists for questions about the escrow fund, APR
and mortgage insurance. All these questions can be answered
correctly even absent any basic understanding of what these
concepts entail.175 If testing does not even guarantee a narrow
concept of comprehension it is unlikely to improve consumer
decision-making.
Understanding relative importance of information: Financial
disclosures contain many types of information, which carry
different weight. In order to effectively use information for making
decisions it is important to understand the relative importance of
information for the actual decision. While the weight given to
information may depend on consumers' preferences or on their
particular situation, as discussed further in the next section, many
optimal decisions depend on preference-independent information
weighting, at least to some extent.
In the context of investment decisions, overlooking the issue
of understanding the relative importance of information and
focusing solely on information being clear, does not address the
concerns raised by the extensive psychology and behavioral
economics literature that has attempted to understand consumer
behavior. This literature discusses two main problems with
consumer decision-making. Firstly, consumers tend to overlook
7 6
the fees charged by funds or else to discount their importance.
There are a number of possible explanations for this behavior
including people's limited processing capacity and low financial
literacy. Moreover, funds often have complex charging structures
Indeed, 92.9% of those receiving the proposed disclosure answered this
question correctly.
174 Also see the examples of questions in which consumers did particularly
well discussed earlier on in this section.
175 See Question 6 "How do these two loans compare in terms of escrow
account?", question 23 "What is the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) for this
loan?" and question 25 "Does this loan have mortgage insurance?" CFPB
173

MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 133.
176 See, e.g., John Beshears, James Choi, David Laibson and Brigitte
Madrian, How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals' Mutual Fund
Choices? page 14 (NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 14859,

2 009), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w 1485 9 [hereinafter: Beshears et

al. 2009]; Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra note 171.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 28:1

making it difficult even for more financially educated investors to
calculate fees1 77 and may attempt to avoid charging more salient
fees while increasing shrouded costs.'
Second, consumers put
disproportionate weight on factors that are far less likely to reflect
the future success of their investment, such as the past
performance of the fund.'79 To a large extent seeing past
performance as predicting future performance is based on peoples
general intuition about past behavior indicating future behavior,
which may be a useful intuition in many other contexts. 80 Other
explanations refer to the saliency and advertising of performance
information to illuminate the importance past performance plays
in investor decisions.' 8 '
Therefore, it is clear that for consumers to make informed
investment decisions they must accurately understand the impact
of fund fees and past performance on future overall returns. The
current testing of financial disclosures would deem a financial
disclosure to be successful if the consumer correctly answered
questions regarding the fee structure and the past performance
table of the fund, but would have not tested whether consumers
knew the relative importance of the information on the final
decision. Similarly, in the case of mortgage disclosures people may
correctly answer questions on whether a loan has a floating interest
rate but lack the tools to evaluate the meaning of the fact that a
loan is a floating loan and how it should affect their decision. This
breaks down the assumed connection between comprehension and
decision-making and shows that the regulatory focus on testing
117 See Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra note 171, at 1422. In this study,
MBA students who recognized the significance of fees were also unable to minimize fees based on the prospectus.
178Santosh Anagol & Hugh Hoikwang-Kim, The Impact of Shrouded Fees:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in the Indian Mutual Funds Market, 102
AM. ECON. REV., 576-593 (2012); Sendhil Mullainathan, Joshua Schwartzstein
& Andrei Shleifer, Coarse Thinking and Persuasion, 123 Q.J. ECON. 577 (2008);
Bruce Carlin, Strategic Price Complexity in Retail FinancialMarkets, 91 J. FIN.

ECON. 278 (2009).

171 See, e.g., John Kozup, Elizabeth Howlett & Michael Pagano, The Effects
of Summary Information on Consumer Perceptions of Mutual Fund Characteristics, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 37 (2008); Ronald T. Wilcox, BargainHunting or
Star Gazing? Investors' Preferencesfor Stock Mutual Funds, 76 J. Bus. 645
(2003); Erik Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J.
FIN. 1619 (1998).
180 See Mullainathan, Schwartzstein & Shleifer, supra note 178, at 605.
181 See Alan Palmiter & Ahmed Taha, Mutual Fund PerformanceAdvertising: Inherently and Materially Misleading?, 46 GA. L. REV. 289, 301 (2012).
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comprehension does not test the ultimate impact of the disclosures
on decision-making and falls short of countering the true
difficulties faced by consumers. Even if consumers were to read
simplified disclosures and understand their content, problems with
financial literacy and the behavioral economics literature suggests
that consumers would continue to make suboptimal investment
decisions.
Knowledge of oneself. Another important way in which
information is used to make a decision involves applying the
information to a particular circumstance. In the context of
mortgages, loans vary along a number of characteristics, and the
preference of one type over another depends on knowing ones
circumstance and interpreting how the loan characteristics are
compatible with the particular circumstance. For example, an
Adjustable Rate Mortgage may be more appropriate for someone
who does not plan to live long-term in the home they are
purchasing. Making a correct decision requires knowing oneself
(how long I plan to live in this home) and how this knowledge
translates to a good decision (Adjustable Rate Mortgages are
unlikely to be good if I plan to live long-term in the home).
Similarly, many investment decisions require adjusting the
investment's risk with the length of the investment and the
proximity to retirement, knowledge that goes beyond
understanding individual fund terms.
Therefore, even if information in the financial disclosure is
understood but then not properly translated to the individual's
circumstances, the disclosure does little to improve the financial
decision. Current testing which focuses on abstract comprehension
overlooks this required connection between comprehension and

improved decision making. 182
3.

Comprehension Tests as "Over-Conclusive"

As discussed above, regulators often assume a connection
between comprehension and improved decision-making; however,
Interestingly, qualitative regulatory testing seems to be more concerned
with actual decision-making. In a Federal Reserve publication from 2008 discussing lessons learnt from consumer testing, its summary of qualitative testing,
unlike quantitative testing, considers how focus groups and interviews can be
used "to identify why and how consumers make decisions and what information
they use in the decision making process." FED. RES. BULL. 2011, supra note 12,
at 8.
112
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in many cases information can be understood but then incorrectly
applied leading to suboptimal financial decisions. Comprehension
tests may also be unhelpful for the opposite reason - they may
require too much from the financial disclosure, since financial
disclosures may be playing a role that is different from the role
comprehension tests assume. Comprehension tests are meant to
conclude more that is required from disclosure and are therefore
"over-conclusive".
It is hard to believe that regulators consider full
comprehension as the benchmark for judging financial disclosures
given their willingness to adopt disclosures even when
comprehension results are low. The final report of the EU study
suggests that although very few consumers who studied the KID
"understood every word or concept" they nonetheless "could
benefit from using the KII document either as a quick first point
of comparison before seeking more detailed information... and a
means of arming themselves with questions to ask a financial
advisor". 8 3 If the purpose of the KIID for many consumers is an
initial exposure to information laying down the foundation for a
future inquiry, it is at odds with the methodology chosen by the
EU to test the KIID. None of the questions in the study related to
whether people intended to seek financial advice or what questions
they would ask following the exposure to the KIID. However,
despite the recognition in the conclusion of the report, the study
was not set up in a way to test these possible benefits to disclosure.
The suggestion in the KIID study report, that financial
disclosures may fulfill a function that comprehension tests fail to
identify, may be correct. There are a number of possible
mechanisms through which financial disclosures improve
decision-making. By focusing on comprehension tests, regulatory
testing today is limited to the mechanism of understanding
financial disclosures and relying on them for financial decisions. If
regulators tested financial decisions or financial attitudes, as
discussed in the next section, rather than comprehension, it would
be possible to widen the inquiry to other mechanisms through
which financial disclosures could influence financial decisionmaking.
An interesting parallel can be made from financial literacy
183 KIID DISCLOSURE RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 105, at 150.
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research. Traditionally financial literacy tests, and the evaluation
of financial education efforts, entailed asking people basic
financial questions 18 4 like the famous Big Three test.8 5 However, a
recent study has taken a different approach in evaluating the
impact of a financial education program.8 6 Carpena et al. used a
randomized experiment to measure the impact of a five-week
education program in India. They suggest that while other
measures of financial literacy rely on numeric and computational
skills, financial education may influence decision-making in other
ways:
"for instance by making individuals and households more
aware of product choices available to them, equipping
them to ask the right questions of financial providers, encouraging them to seek professional and personalized financial advice, and changing their attitudes towards purchasing and recommending formal financial products
8 7
and services.'
In their study, Carpena et al. find that while the financial
education program did not improve financial decisions that
required numeracy, it did improve participants' financial product
awareness and attitudes towards financial products.18
Similarly, in the context of financial disclosures,
comprehension tests may be failing to identify the correct
mechanism through which disclosure might improve financial
decision-making. Current regulatory testing looks exclusively to
full comprehension of financial disclosures as the standard of
effectiveness. However, the notion of disclosure supporting
decision-making through this mechanism has been recognized by
previous literature on disclosure. For example, Kozup et al. argue
that disclosures can educate consumers more broadly about
184 For recent surveys on financial literacy see Lusardi & Mitchell, supra
note 4; Hastings, Madrian and Skimmyhorn, supra note 35.
"8I Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, FinancialLiteracy and Plan-

ning: ImplicationsforRetirement Wellbeing (PENSION RES. COUNCIL, Working

Paper No. 17078, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 7078.pdf.
186 Fenella Carpena, Unpacking the Causal Chain of Financial Literacy
(THE WORLD BANK, Working Paper No. 5798, 2011).
187 id. at 3.
'1 Id. at 13.
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financial products or the industry and Perry and Blumenthal argue
that disclosure can encourage consumers to engage in seeking
additional information.8 9 However, the current focus on
comprehension omits the possibility of testing these hypotheses.
Another alternative mechanism through which disclosure
can improve decisions is through influencing consumer decisions
aiming at consumers' more intuitive processes without necessarily
making them more informed. 910 This is what Ryan Bubb referred
to as "System 1 disclosure", as it aims at our cognitive processes
that are automatic and unconscious.1 9' A classic example of such a
disclosure is the mandated images on cigarette boxes that depict
the negative health effects of smoking. These images are unlikely
to be more informative than the warnings that have long existed
on cigarette packages. Instead these images wish to influence
intuitive rather than deliberative choices. In the context of
financial disclosures, regulators could encourage the selection of
certain loans or funds through designing disclosures that
encourage an intuitive decision. These types of disclosures may not
be more informative but can "nudge" people to make decisions that
are more welfare increasing.
The use of such a mechanism relies on the identification of
a welfare increasing decision192 , which may not be uniform for all
consumers for many financial decisions. In addition, such a policy
would require regulators to justify why the use of influencing
93
through disclosure is preferable to other regulatory options.1

Vanessa Perry & Pamela Blumenthal, Understanding the Fine Print:
The Need ForEffective Testing of Mandatory Mortgage Loan Disclosures, 31 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 305 (2012); Kozup, Howlett & Pagano, supra note
179, at 49.
190 Note that there is a sense in which System 1 disclosure may debias consumers and therefore may be considered informative. See Christine Jolls & Cass
Sunstein, DebiasingThrough Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006).
191 See Bubb, supra note 7. For a general account of the two systems see
189

DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
192 For a discussion on the potential difference between revealed preferences and normative preferences, see John Beshears, How are Preferences Revealed?, 92 J. OF PUB. ECON. 1787 (2008) [hereinafter: HOW ARE PREFERENCES

REVEALED?].
193

Bubb, supra note 7, at 117.
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4. Creating Documents that Score Well

Another concern raised by the indirect comprehension tests
is that regulators, either consciously or unconsciously, will create
disclosure documents that score higher on comprehension tests or
tailor the comprehension tests to the disclosure. This further
increases the likelihood that the comprehension and decisionmaking will diverge. Testing actual impact of the disclosure
directly mitigates the ability of regulators to design disclosures that
score high on comprehension tests while providing little assistance
to consumers.
The concern is similar to the problem of "teaching to the
test" in teaching evaluations. In that context knowledge and skills
test results are used to make broader inferences regarding the level
of proficiency of students on a certain topic or quality of teaching.
However, through focusing on preparing students to score highly
on the tests, the ability of the test results to serve as a reflection of
broader abilities than those tested breaks down.194 In this context
the problem arises because only a narrow part of the body of
knowledge is being tested, whereas with financial disclosures
testing focuses only on a proxy for improved decision-making. As
discussed above, particularly in the case of the CFPB, the
proximity between the wording of some questions and the'
headings used in the disclosure, raise serious doubts as to the
general inference to be made from the testing.
In the next section I discuss ways in which the testing of
financial disclosures can be improved to examine a broader set of
mechanisms through which financial disclosures can improve
decision-making.
V. CHANGING THE WAY WE TEST DISCLOSURE
Although some of the suggestions relate to the expansion of
the scope of testing, such as retrospective analysis and dynamic
testing, my main concern is not that insufficient resources are being
invested in regulatory testing, but that these resources are
misplaced. The concept of what needs to be tested is my focus, and
not on the lack of regulatory resources allocated. In many cases,
testing is already relatively extensive. The CFPB testing, for
example, included several stages of qualitative and quantitative
194

(2001).

See James Popham, Teaching to the Test?, 58 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 16
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testing in addition to internal CFPB efforts to develop proposed
disclosure documents. Moreover, previous consumer testing
regarding the updating of mortgage disclosure took place over a
few years, when the Federal Reserve was in charge of updating
Regulation Z. Therefore, this paper relates to areas of regulation
that government has already decided to invest significant efforts in
testing while aiming at the wrong target.
A. Redesigning Testing Within Current Framework
Even within the current framework, in which disclosures
are tested in lab settings, testing methodologies should be better
aligned with the desired outcome of disclosures. I discuss how to
redesign testing if the desired outcome is improved decisionmaking. I also suggest ways to test other potentially desirable
outcomes.
1. Focusing on Decisions
An important preliminary question is whether regulators
are (or should be) concerned with whether consumer decisions are
good decisions.'9 5 The CFPB's mission is to ensure that consumers
receive information that allows them to make decisions they
believe are best for them. 196 Conceivably, the CFPB may hold that
a person making a decision they believe to be good is the goal in
and of itself.1 97 One could argue that disclosure can provide people
a sense of control or autonomy1 9 regardless of its effect on their
welfare.199
However, this too does not correspond to the way regulators
191 This article does deal directly with the question of what a "good" decision is, and rather assumes that a good decision is one that increases a person's
welfare. While there are many aspects of life in which there is significant uncertainty as to what increases one's welfare, in the context of consumer finance, in
which one's objective is primarily pecuniary gain, these questions are less important.
196 About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
erfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited October 1, 2015).
117

www.consum-

See also Rubin, supra note 44 (who discuss the confusion TILA creates

between the goal of legislation and the means of achieving it).

198 Such a suggestion is made in Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The
Failureof Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 650 (2011).

1 overlook the possibility that increasing one's sense of control in and of
itself increases one's own welfare. For a more detailed discussion see WHY
NUDGE?, supra note 19.
199
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test proposed disclosures, or to what regulators ought to care
about. Firstly, the EU or the CFPB did not test even this narrow
sense of a decision being "good". Moreover, it would also be
incorrect to conclude that a mere decision reflects one's belief that
it is a good decision.2°° Second, it is doubtful whether this is a
worthy purpose of regulation. The concern on which regulatory
intervention is based focuses on problematic decisions consumers
make because of cognitive limitations and their possible
exploitations. 0 1 This is different than defining the concern as
consumer's subjective feeling that they are making suboptimal
decisions. Therefore, it is unlikely that financial regulators
themselves consider this the goal of regulation given that they have
not articulated such a justification and often refer to goals of
improved consumer outcomes. °2
I therefore assume that regulators wish to improve
consumer decision-making and would not hold that it is sufficient
that disclosures are thinly comprehensible when tested even if
consumers continue to make detrimental mistakes. My focus will
be on measuring actual decision making rather than
comprehension and trying to unravel the mechanism through
which disclosures may improve financial decisions.
2. Directly Testing Decisions
If improving financial decisions is the aim of regulation, it
should be the subject of regulatory testing. Beyond the indirectness
of testing for improved decision-making through comprehension
tests, the previous section also provided several reasons to doubt
that comprehension may be a proxy for improved decisions.
Several studies have focused on decisions themselves as the
measured outcome of experiments. For example, in the Beshears et
200 See, e.g., How ARE PREFERENCES REVEALED?, supra note 192, which

discusses the ways in which revealed preferences and normative preferences diverge. One of these cases might be when self reported preferences are different
than choices, id. at 1792, so that one could make a decision being aware that it
does not align with their preferences. This may be particularly true of complex
decisions. Id. at 1788. This is clearly demonstrated in the study by Choi where
participants invested in mutual funds with varying fees and were asked about
their level of confidence in their decision. They showed that confidence that the
decision was a right one fell with fees.
201 See supra Part I for the discussion.
202 See also supra Part I.
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al.20 3 and Choi et al. experiments, subjects were asked to make
investment decisions and were paid in accordance to the
performance of their portfolio. These experiments therefore
provide two advantages over the CFPB and the EU's testing.
Firstly, they ask subjects to actually make decisions based on the
documents rather than simply ask them to answer questions about
the documents. Second, they provide real monetary incentives for
their decisions. 0 4
There was one stage of the CFPB testing that involved
making a decision. As mentioned above, Part 1 of the testing
required subjects to examine two initial disclosures and select the
loan they preferred. Although this may seem as the desired
methodology in testing how disclosure impacts decisions, this was
a minor part of the testing, both according to the CFPB's own
account, and in terms of the evaluation of the task. The CFPB
limited its analysis to the issue of whether subjects were able to
articulate a justification for their choice and how many
justifications they were able to provide. The CFPB designed the
loan disclosures so that "neither loan was a "better" loan, so the
CFPB's analysis made no judgment about which loan was
selected".2"" This is a curious study design if one's purpose would
be to see whether the disclosures improve consumer choices.
The conclusion is that regulatory testing should focus on
asking people to make a financial decision, thereby testing how the
exposure to different disclosures effects their decisions. In the
previous section, I provided several reasons not to assume a direct
connection between comprehension of a disclosure and disclosure
leading to better decisions. Underlying many of my examples is
that using disclosure to make an informed decision may require
skills and knowledge external to the disclosure itself. Therefore,
directly testing decisions may expose cases in which disclosure
simply cannot be relied upon to protect consumers, as the
disclosure alone cannot lead to improved decisions. These cases, in
which disclosure may be an inappropriate regulatory tool, are
currently obscured by the comprehension test methodology.
One challenge created by the testing of decisions is that one
203 See supra note 176.
204 See supra note 166

experiments).
20

(discussing the influence of monetary incentives in

CFPB MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 133, at 20.

2015

Putting Disclosure to the Test

must decide how to evaluate decisions. In the case of
comprehension tests, this concern does not arise, as a response to a
comprehension question is either true or false. The next section
deals with the question of how participants' choices can be
evaluated to determine the impact of the financial disclosure. I
wish to avoid overarching claims that regulators are able to always
determine what a good financial decision is for every individual,
and instead focus on the opportunity that experimental design
offers for making inferences in easier cases. While I provide an
outline and initial analysis of the various strategies regulators can
use to evaluate decisions, further research is needed for a particular
disclosure and financial decision being considered.
3.

Benchmarks for Determining Improved Decisions

Any analysis of a disclosure's effectiveness must contain
criterion for determining whether the decision is an improved
decision. I suggest a number of ways in which decisions can be
judged.
Cases in which there is clearly an inferior decision. In many
contexts a financial decision is clearly worse than another decision,
such as selecting a mortgage that is dominated by another
mortgage offered. In the context of regulatory testing it is also
possible to design the experiment to include dominated options.
For example, two mutual funds may follow the same index and
differ only on fees, so that selecting the fund with lower fees is
clearly preferable. 06
Similarly, mortgage disclosures can be designed in a way
that one loan is more expensive than another. In an experiment
sponsored by the European Commission on retail investment
consumer decision-making, over 6,000 participants from eight
Member States were asked to make a number of investment
decisions. °7 In each case one investment option had the highest
expected value, and therefore the experiment was designed to see
206 The experiment by Choi had such a design, where subjects were asked

to allocate funds to essentially identical index funds, differing only on the fees
they charge. See Choi, et. al, supra note 171.
207 The purpose of the project was to study consumer decision-making and
was unrelated to the testing of mandated disclosures, Nick Chater, Steffen
Huck, & Roman Inderst, Consumer Decision-Makingin Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural Economics Perspective, EUR. COMM'N (2010) [hereinafter
EC DECISION-MAKING REPORT 2 010].
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whether consumers selected the optimal investment choice. °8 Such
experiment designs allow for easy evaluation of consumer
decisions.
Consumers often face dominated options in real-life
situations, which strengthens the case for using such an
experimental design, and also creating opportunities for testing
real-life decisions. One recent example appears in a study of
Bhargava et al., which discusses a US firm that permitted
employees to select their own health insurance plan from a
standardized menu that included many dominated options. They
found that the majority of employees chose dominated health
insurance options. °9
Perry and Blumenthal suggest a way of evaluating
decisions that is slightly more complex than when one option is
clearly better than another, which can be used when the study is a
field experiment and not in a controlled environment. They suggest
that performance of loans selected by consumers be tracked over
time to see the incidence and severity of late payments and defaults
to determine whether disclosure led to consumers selecting loans
with lower rates, late payments and defaults.210
Articulation of justification. There may be instances in which
evaluating a decision may depend on a consumer's preferences.
Therefore another way to evaluate decisions is to require
participants to explain their decision. In the case of the CFPB
study, justifications were simply counted to see the "robustness" of
participants' justifications for their decisions. In a quantitative
study co-sponsored by several federal agencies relating to financial
privacy notice required under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, a
different approach was taken. 1 ' In that study, participants were
208 The study justifies considering the investment with the highest expected

value as being optimal based on expected utility maximization over one's
wealth. See id., at 264.
209 Saurabh Bhargava, George Loewenstein & Justin Sydnor, Do Individuals Make Sensible Health Insurance Decisions? Evidence from a Menu with
Dominated Options (AM. ECON. REV., Working Paper No. 21160, 2015).
210 Perry & Blumenthal, supranote 189, at 309.
211 Alan Levy & Manoj Hastak, Consumer Comprehension of Financial
Privacy Notices: A Report on the Results of the Quantitative Testing, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/quantitative-research-levy-hastak-reportquantitativeresearch-_levy-hastakjreport.pdf.

2015

Putting Disclosure to the Test

asked to compare two bank privacy notices, assuming they provide
identical products, and select which bank they prefer and explain
why. 1 2 They then coded the justifications for the decision to
identify when participants provided well-reasoned responses.
Although this study falls short of a full examination of
consumer decisions, it evaluates the justifications given for
consumer choices in order to determine whether a decision was
informed or whether the reasons given for the decision were
irrelevant or incorrect.
Consistency with stated preferences. The FTC financial privacy
notice testing mentioned above dealt with disclosures that mostly
differed on two dimensions - the extent of information sharing and
number of opt-out possibilities. More sophisticated testing of
financial disclosures may involve comparing multiple loans with
several characteristics in which no loan is strictly preferable to
another.
One way to evaluate decisions is on their consistency with
a person's stated preferences. So for example, participants' risk
preferences can be elicited before or after being asked to select a
mutual fund to invest in. Researchers can then evaluate decisions
in terms of their consistency with preferences." 3
However, such a methodology relies on the people's stated
preferences reflecting their true preferences and on the belief in the
stability of people's preferences. There are many reasons to doubt
these two assumptions, as people do not always accurately state
their preferences2 14 and preferences depend heavily on the context
in which they are extracted.2 15 Therefore, attempts to evaluate
212

See also FED.

PRIVATE

RESERVE BD., CONSUMER RESEARCH AND TESTING FOR

EDUCATION LOANS: REPORT OF FINDINGS (2009), available at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg2009O31 la8.pdf.
23 See, e.g., Glenn Harrison, Ronald Harstad & Elisabet Rutstrom, Experimental Methods and Elicitationof Values, 7 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 123 (2004).
214 On the difficulty of eliciting true risk preferences see for example Ronald
Cummings & Laura Taylor, Unbiased Value Estimates for Environ-mental
Goods: A Cheap Talk Design for the Contingent Valuation Method, 89 AM.
ECON. REV. 649, (1999). See also Steven Levitt & John List, What Do Laboratory
Experiments Measuring Social PreferencesReveal About the Real World, 21 J.
ECON. PERSP. 153 (2007) (in the context of social preferences).
211 See e.g., Steffen Anderson, et al., Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences,
76 ECONOMETRICA 583 (2008) (in the experiment the joint elicitation of risk and
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decisions based on their consistency with elicited preferences
should be done with caution.2 16
Do the decisions correlate with expectations of group preferences?
In cases in which personal preferences are difficult to extract, one
could use group preferences and examine whether they correlate
with people's decisions. Rather than comparing an individual's
preferences to a decision made after exposure to disclosure
materials, inference is statistical based on group characteristics.
Peter Ubel discusses this strategy in the context of medical
decision aids in which one would expect, for example, that the
stage of cancer would correlate with preferences for particular
treatments. 1 7 While on an individual level people may have
personal preferences on other treatment dimensions, we would
expect certain patterns to be revealed when comparing groups in
aggregate. If aggregate decisions using medical decision aids show
no correlation between levels of risk of cancer and the chosen
treatment, one might be skeptical as to the effectiveness of the
decision aid. In the context of consumer finance, whether to take a
30-year loan versus 15-year loan will depend partially on whether
this is the first home being purchased or whether the consumer is
above a certain age. While consumers within these two groups may
have many additional idiosyncratic preferences beyond the length
of the loan, if consumers who are purchasing their first home take
out shorter loans than older consumers, concerns are raised
regarding consumer decision-making.
While I do not wish to undervalue the importance of
time preferences yielding different results than when they were elicited separately); Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, Reconciling Normative and Behavioral Economics: The Problems to be Solved, 18 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 560
(2012).
216 For a broader discussion on how to determine preferences see How are
PreferencesRevealed?, supra note 192. A similar concern is raised by Peter Ubel
who discusses deriving preferences in the context of quantifying utility values
for the purpose of medical treatment and the evaluation of medical decision aids,
as an individual's risk appetite is relevant to their preferred medical treatment.
Ubel references a number of common methods such as deriving utility from the
standard gamble method. However accurately estimating risk preferences, even
when examined through revealed preferences and not stated preferences, can be
misleading as people are often deeply confused when dealing with probabilities
and risk. See Peter Ubel, Beyond Comprehension:Figuring Out Whether Decision Aids Improve People's Decision, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafir ed. 2012).
217 See Ubel, supra note 216, at 357.
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personal preferences in financial decisions, the difficulty in
extracting these preferences and comparing people's decisions to
these preferences should not deter regulators from evaluating
decisions when they are not preference sensitive, or at least not
strongly preference sensitive. Regulatory testing can make
significant progress before attempting harder questions regarding
idiosyncratic preferences, as financial decisions are often easier to
evaluate objectively.
B. Testing Alternative Mechanisms
When discussing the shortcomings of the comprehension
tests currently used by regulators, one concern was that regulators
assumed that the way in which disclosures helped consumers was
by making consumers fully informed after comprehending the
disclosure. This, however, overlooks other mechanisms by which
disclosures may lead to better financial outcomes.2 18
One way in which disclosure may lead to better financial
outcomes, not directly through full comprehension, is by flagging
to the consumer the various aspects of the decision and the
different components to consider. For example, a consumer who is
considering taking a mortgage loan for the first time may be
unaware of prepayment penalties, balloon payments or
refinancing options. After reading the disclosure, a consumer still
may have difficulty understanding what these payments are and
accurately estimating their significance, but the consumer may
now know these are important aspects of the loan and may choose
to further seek information on these payments or seek advice.2 1 9
This is not to argue that disclosures necessarily work in this
manner or improve financial outcomes this way, but to illustrate
that there are other probable mechanisms through which
disclosure may impact people that are overlooked by current
testing methodologies. Comprehension questions like "How much
principle will you pay in 5 years?"2 2 or "What is the highest
218 See supra Part IV.D.3, talking about comprehension as over-conclusive.
21 See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer

ContractLaw, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014). They suggest that disclosures emphasize information that is surprising to consumers. Although quite different to
my proposal, they too suggest that disclosure play an alternative role to making
consumers fully informed.
220 CFPB MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY, supra note 133, at Question 24.
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possible monthly principal and interest payment? '221 may be
incorrectly answered by consumers who nonetheless have
increased awareness after being exposed to disclosures and may be
better equipped when seeking professional advice.
Regulatory testing needs to include a way to test whether
these alternative mechanisms exist. The best way to test the impact
of disclosures over time is through randomized control trials,
discussed in the next section. There are also ways to test such
mechanisms in more experimental settings, such as asking
questions about future intentions to seek advice. People can be
asked about awareness of certain payments and elements of
financial decisions, without being asked comprehension questions.
C. Expanding Testing Efforts
In many cases the reliance on lab testing to determine the
impact of disclosure is insufficient. Particularly in areas in which
regulators rely heavily on disclosure to protect consumers, testing
should be done through randomized control trials and
retrospective analysis. In cases in which there are grave concerns
regarding misalignment of incentives of disclosees and consumers,
dynamic testing should be used to predict the effect of disclosure
requirements on regulated entities.
1. Real-life Testing
Experiments have become a common way of testing
decision-making in the social sciences and should be used in the
regulatory context too. However, experiments raise several
concerns with regards to their ability to test real-life behavior and
long-term effects. While observational studies can provide some
information on real-life effects of financial disclosures, randomized
controlled trials (RCT) allow for experimentation in which
causality can be inferred.2 2 In a RCT, a group is allocated at
random to receive an intervention or treatment to examine the
effect of the treatment on a certain outcome. This allows a study to
avoid various problems with uncontrolled studies such as the
impact of external factors and selection bias.

supra note 133, at Question 38.

221

CFPB

122

Cass Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.

MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE STUDY,

1349, 1371 (2011).
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RCTs have been used to test the effect of medication for
over 60 years and have become increasingly central in shaping
development policy in low and middle-income countries. 23
However, RCTs continue to play a far more limited role in testing
effectiveness of public policy interventions in the developed
world. 2 4 Policy makers for several reasons have shown resistance
towards RCTs such as the possible costs RCTs entail and various
ethical objections. 225 For example, some claim that if a new
intervention is beneficial it would be unethical to deny it to a
certain group for the sake of the study.
It is questionable what weight these concerns should carry.
Regarding the costs of RCTs, considering the resources that the
CFPB and EU study required it is doubtful whether an RCT
would be significantly costlier given that a real-life context
requires less participant recruitment. 226 Moreover, the cost of
RCTs should be considered in the context of their estimated benefit
to consumers. With regards to the inequitable treatment
necessitated by RCTs, the gradual introduction of new policies is
quite common, and is rarely objected to on moral grounds.22 7 In
223

Christopher Deeming, Trials and Tribulations:The 'Use' (and 'Misuse')

of Evidence in Public Policy, 47 SOC. POL'Y &ADMIN. 359, 360 (2013).
224 See LAURA HAYNES, ET AL., TEST, LEARN, ADAPT: DEVELOPING
PUBLIC POLICY WITH RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIALS, BEHAV. INSIGHTS

TEAM 6 (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sysVarious
legal
tem/uploads/attachmentdata/file/62529/TLA- 1906126.pdf.
scholars have advocated the use of field tests. See, e.g., ALAN SCHWARTZ,
REGULATING FOR RATIONALITY (2014) (suggesting that field tests are a way to

enable to regulator to overcome the uncertainty of how biases from experimental
research will interact in reality); Thomas Ulen, A Behavioral View of Investor
Protection,44 LOYOLA UNIV. CHI. L. J. 1357 (2013).

For a discussion of the use of RCTs for implementing law and the possible objections, see Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Random225

izing Law, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 929, 961 (2010); See also Rubin, supra note 44,

at 302 (Rubin also suggests that political considerations avoid field experiments,
as the opportunity window to implement new rules may be narrow and not to
be wasted on experimentation).
226 Haynes, et al., supra note 224 at 15. Where they argue that the costs of
RCTs are often exaggerated.
227 This has led to the articulation of the conditions under which RCTs are
ethically permissible. See R. Boruch, et al., Randomized Controlled Trials for
Evaluation and Planning, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED SOCIAL

RESEARCH 147 (Leonard Bickman & Debra J. Rog eds., 2009); Fives et al., The
Ethics of Randomized Control Trials in Social Settings: Can Social Trials be
Scientifically Promising and Must There be Equipoise?, INT'L J. RES. &
METHOD IN EDUC. (2014); See also Abramowicz, Ayres & Listokin, supra note
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general, a shift away from determining the benefits of regulation
in abstract means that there is uncertainty regarding the effect of
regulation and so RCTs cannot be characterized as a denial of a
known benefit to one group.2 28 Matthew Spitzer and Eric Talley
have recently discussed how the ability of regulators to engage in
experimentation of new rules presents significant option value,
since the regulator can simply revert back to the existing regulation
if the new regulation is demonstrated as not beneficial. 29
To date a number of RCTs have been conducted by legal
academics,2 30 as well as some regulatory attempts, such as the
RCTs run by the Behavioural Insights Team in the UK.2 3 1 One
challenge to the implementation of RCTs is accurately defining the
control group. A possible set up would be to expose the randomized
treatment group to the proposed disclosure document while the
control group would receive the existing disclosures.2 32 Since
people may compare loans from different originators randomizing
at the level of geographical areas may be preferable to the
individual originator, although this may create a heavy burden for
originators that cover multiple areas.
RCTs would allow for several benefits in comparison to
current experimentation practices. As discussed above, lab
conditions may make people sufficiently focused on the disclosure
to be able to understand the document, even when in reality people
do not read them, or that they do not devote the needed cognitive
225.

228 On this topic see JIM MANZI, UNCONTROLLED: THE SURPRISING
PAYOFF OF TRIAL AND ERROR FOR BUSINESS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY (2012).
229 See Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, On Experimentationand Real Op-

tions in FinancialRegulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2014). The argument is
more sophisticated than presented here. They develop a game theoretic model
in which benefits and costs of experimentation are borne differently by regulators and courts leading to tension between the two.
230 See, e.g. Dalie Jimenez, et al., Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A Research and Clinical
Approach, 20 GEORGETOWN J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 449 (2013); James
Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District
Court and Prospectsfor the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 903 (2013).
231 See Haynes, et al., supra note 224.
232 The cleanest control group may be a group that receives no disclosure at
all, however, given how old TILA disclosure requirements are this may be unrealistic to consider a control group as one that receives no disclosure at all. See
Perry & Blumenthal, supra note 189, at 310.
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resources to understand them. RCTs would allow regulators to
overcome this problem with current testing practices as well as
allow them to test the impact of disclosures with human interaction
of brokers and other service suppliers.
Ben Shahar and Schneider argue that the one type of cost
of disclosure overlooked by regulators is the "accumulation
problem". 33 They claim that disclosures extract from one another
by competing for consumers' limited attention and ability to
understand disclosure. Because different regulatory agencies
develop disclosure materials in isolation from other disclosures,
they are unaware of the interaction between disclosures. Fieldtesting of disclosures is likely to expose the extent of Ben Shahar
and Schneider's disclosure externalities concern, bringing what
they claim to be a covert phenomenon to the surface.
2. Retrospective Analysis
Another important element of effective testing is to include
retrospective testing after the financial disclosure has been
adopted. After the adoption of a financial disclosure there is more
information available on how people use the disclosure and the
extent to which it improves decisions. Mechanisms that work over
time, such as financial disclosure, creating awareness of the
different aspects of a mortgage loan or mutual fund investment,
are hard to test in a short experiment, so that post adoption
analysis can reveal long-term outcomes. 2 34 Despite the fact that
more is known post adoption, most testing efforts focus on the
stage prior to adoption.
The importance of regulatory look-back has been
somewhat recognized since the Carter Administration in 1978;
23 6
however, retrospective review has not consistently been applied.
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See Futility of CBA, supra note 42.
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See also Executive Order No. 13563 (2011) (supporting retrospective

analysis). For an overview of retrospective analysis techniques see Josepth Aldy,
Learning From Experience: An Assessment of the Retrospective Review of
Agency Rules and the Evidence for Improving the Design and Implementation
of Regulatory Policy, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., at 17 (2014).
235

CARY

PERFORMANCE:

COGLIANESE,
EVALUATING

REGULATORY POLICY (2012).
236

OECD,
THE

MEASURING
REGULATORY
AND
OF
REGULATION

IMPACT

For a review of retrospective analysis see Aldy, supra note 234, at 27.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 28:1

The Obama Administration issued several Executive Orders that
recognize the importance of retrospective testing, with three
executive orders emphasizing the need for analysis and review of
existing federal rules.2 37 A recent analysis of retrospective review
based on the 2011 OMB report to Congress on federal regulation
by Randall Lutter2 38 revealed that retrospective analysis was
incomplete in the cases discussed in the report. Another report by
Joseph Aldy discusses similar results.239
Regarding independent agencies, like the SEC and the
CFPB, guidelines should be developed requiring outlines of
expected retrospective analysis at the time of adoption, as well as
designing implementation of regulation to facilitate such
analysis. 24 ° For example, implementation of regulation is a way

that resembles a RCT allowing for meaningful analysis post
adoption.241
3. Dynamic Testing
A central issue to the success of consumer financial
regulation is the response of the regulated entity. In the past,
regulated entities have significantly undermined consumer
financial regulation. For example, financial institutions weakened
The requirement for retrospective analysis appeared in earlier Executive Orders, such as Reagan's Executive Order No. 12291 (1981) and Clinton's Executive Order No. 12866 (1993). However, the review of regulation was not consistent prior to Obama's Executive Orders.
237 Executive Order No. 13563 (2011); Executive Order No. 13579 (2011),
applying to independent agencies; Executive Order No. 13610 (2012). For a detailed discussion of the different provisions requiring retrospective analysis see
Lutter.
238 Randall Lutter, RegulatoryPolicy: What Rolefor Retrospective Analysis
and Review?, 4 J. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 17 (2013).
239 Aldy, supra note 234.

Executive Order No. 135 79 relates to independent agencies, encouraging
them to expand retrospective analysis. Independent agencies have dedicated
some attention to retrospective analysis. See, e.g., SEC Request for Information
on Retrospective Review of Existing Regulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 176 (Sept. 12,
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-09-12/pdf/201123179.pdf. Regarding the CFPB, under Section 1022 of Dodd-Frank, defining
the CFPB's rule-making authority, the CFPB is instructed to provide retrospective analysis of its regulation: "The Bureau shall conduct an assessment of each
significant rule or order adopted by the Bureau under Federal consumer law."
240

12 U.S.C. § 5511 (Dodd-Frank § 1022.d).

For the proposal the prospective analysis include an outline of future
retrospective analysis, see Aldy, supra note 234, at 17.
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the default for consumer checking account overdraft coverage 242
and have undermined regulation through shifting credit card
expenses to non-salient fees.243
In many cases disclosure regulation lays down the basic
requirements of the disclosure document but allows the industry
considerable discretion. This discretion is not always exercised in
a way that is optimal for consumers. For example, the SEC
summary prospectus Final Rule did not contain a page limitation,
but rather stated that its intent was "that funds prepare a concise
summary (on the order of three or four pages) that will provide key
information".2 " However, the SEC Guidance Regarding Mutual
Fund Enhanced Disclosure from June 2014245 stated that: "it is not
unusual for the staff to review filings with Summary Sections that
are longer than ten pages for a single mutual fund and sometimes
almost twenty pages in length."24' 6
The SEC summary prospectus rules include additional
levels of discretion that may be of more concern, such as the
drafting of the principal risks and investment strategies of the
summary prospectus, and the general formatting of the document,
which is left to the regulated entity to determine. Oehler et al.
found that in the case of KIID in Europe, disclosures created by
issuers and suppliers were evaluated as inadequate in assisting
consumers relative to the neutral document developed by the
researchers.24 7
Even when the regulators closely dictate the content of the
disclosure, such as in the case of TILA and RESPA disclosures, the
industry often has control over the context in which consumers
receive the disclosure. As discussed above in beginning of this
section, the effect of disclosure can be diluted by providing many
242 See Lauren Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1155 (2013).
243 See Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing:The CardAct and

Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (2011). See also Sumit Agarwal, et al., Regulating Consumer Financial Products: Evidence from Credit Cards, Q.J. OF
ECON. 111 (2015).
244 SEC Summary Prospectus, supra note 67, at 4551.
145

SECURITIES EXCH. COMM'N, GUIDANCE REGARDING MUTUAL FUND

ENHANCED DISCLOSURE (Jun. 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/investmentiim-guidance-2014-08.pdf.
241

Id. at 2.

247 Oehler, Hofer & Wendt, supra note 126
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other documents or by crowding out their effect with human
interaction.2 4
Another concern is that financial disclosures are sometimes
designed to make certain costs and features salient that are
currently worrisome, however regulated entities may respond by
restructuring their fees and shifting charges towards more
shrouded costs. 2 49 A paper by Anagol and Hoikwang Kim 250 shows
that a regulatory change allowing closed-end funds to shroud front
load fees led to investments being diverted from open-end funds to
closed-end funds. Concerns along these lines were raised in the
context of the SEC's summary prospectus that does not require
funds to include the turnover rate,2 5' relating to the percentage of
the fund's assets that have changed over the past year resulting in
potentially significant transaction costs, 25 2 in the fees section. This
may result in funds increasing the fees charged through this
shrouded channel.
In the context of disclosure of conflicts of interest there is
evidence that the disclosure may backfire and lead to changes in
behavior of advisors.5 3 When the disclosure of conflicts of interest
itself alters the behavior of the discloser, regulatory testing should
not focus solely on consumer responses to the disclosure.
Despite the centrality of the regulated entities' responses to
the success of regulation, current testing does not consider these
reactions prior to the adoption of disclosures. Therefore, another
important element of effective testing of proposed financial
See also supra Part IV.B., discussing the problems with the development
of the "neutral" KIID.
249 In the credit card context, see Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 243.
250 Anagol & Hoikwang-Kim, supra note 178.
248

251 SEC SUMMARY PROSPECTUS, supra note 67, at 30.

Roger Edelen, Richard Evens & Gregory Kadlec, Scale Effects in Mutual Fund Performance: The Role of Trading Costs, at 3 (Mar. 17, 2007), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=951367.
253 In an experiment by Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore participants who
were "estimators" were rewarded by the proximity of their estimate to the actual
amount of coins in a jar. Some participants who were "advisors", who were provided more information than estimators, were paid more when estimators responded with high rather than accurate values. The results showed that advisors that were required to disclose this conflict of interest exaggerated their
advice more than those who were not required to disclose. See Cain, Loewenstein & Moore, supra note 172.
212
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disclosures or retrospective analysis should be the impact on the
regulated entities required to create or provide the disclosures.
Since industry responses to regulation may be hard to predict,
there is a need to develop a methodology for anticipating industry
responses, including dynamic testing, prior to adoption. 4
Even without experimentation a significant amount can be
learned from experience with previously adopted financial
disclosures and the industry's response to various requirements.
Through retrospective analysis of regulation, regulators can infer
when discretion was appropriate and when not. They can also
infer the types of regulation that are particularly sensitive to
regulatory arbitrage. 55
Regarding prospective regulation, one way in which this
can be tested is by simulating the dilemma that regulated entities
might encounter. On the one hand regulated entities presumably
wish to abide by the legal requirements in terms of the content and
delivery of disclosure. On the other hand regulated entities wish to
remain profitable, and if profitability was partially the result of
consumers taking loans with higher interest rates or investing in
funds with higher fees, this interest will persist. Experiments could
involve participants who are likely to face similar dilemmas in the
future, such as business school students. Participants could be
asked to develop disclosure materials and loan terms that could
then be used as the basis for an experiment comparing consumer
decisions based on those disclosures relative to disclosures
developed by a group with incentives more aligned with consumer
welfare.
More extensive experiments could involve participants
being given the role of the loan originator or mortgage broker,
required to maximize their profits through offering loans to
another group of people. Beyond developing the disclosures,
participants could be asked to act as brokers whereby determining
"I Willis suggests another way to respond to this problem by requiring
firms to demonstrate that their consumers understand products and services
they purchase. See Lauren Willis, The Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau
and the Quest for Consumer Comprehension (May 14, 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstractid=2606373.
2S5 For an initial attempt to analyze when regulation may be undermined
by regulated entities see Michael Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir,
Behaviorally Informed Financial Services Regulation, NEW AM. FOUND.
(2008).
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the environment in which other participants receive the disclosure.
Experiment compensation could be tied to profitability of the loans
consumers eventually select.
Mandated disclosures shape financial products and the
behavior of financial institutions and intermediaries. Regulators
have dedicated very little analysis to industry reactions to
mandated disclosure. Consideration in the abstract of these
reactions can be insufficient as industry responses may be hard to
predict. Instead regulators should expand testing of proposed
regulation to test industry responses.
VI.CONCLUSION
Fundamental changes need to take place in the way
financial regulators validate disclosures. The prevalent use of
disclosure requires that regulators adequately demonstrate that
their mandated disclosures actually assist people in making better
financial decisions.
This article has discussed two recent examples of
quantitative testing in depth, which demonstrate the significant
resources dedicated to consumer testing. Considering the future of
testing, many of the issues currently under consideration by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and other consumer
financial regulators, such as payday lending, credit cards and
insurance, also rely heavily on disclosure. Accordingly, we can
expect that consumer testing will increasingly be used to adopt and
justify these disclosures.
It is therefore worrying that current testing methodologies
are on the wrong track and do not fulfill the purpose of testing
whether disclosures will improve decision-making. Firstly,
regulators have inadequately articulated the purpose of
disclosures, and therefore also the purpose of testing. While
regulators seem to be concerned with improving consumer
decision-making, they confuse improved decisions with improved
comprehension of disclosures. Since comprehension and improved
decisions often diverge, the current testing methodology is
misguided. Second, regulators limit their testing to one type of
benefit of disclosure, namely making consumers fully informed,
when in fact disclosures are possibly beneficial in other more subtle
ways, such as creating general awareness of the need to seek
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further advice and information. Even if the purpose of disclosure
is to make consumers fully informed, the results from regulatory
testing cast doubt on whether this goal is achieved by newly
adopted disclosures.
Given these shortcomings I suggest that regulators rethink
the design of their tests for validating disclosure. Financial
regulators need to reconsider their theory regarding the potential
benefit of disclosure and the purpose of testing. They must focus
on consumer decision-making by evaluating decisions made based
on disclosure, and not only on comprehension, and so provide a
more complete picture of the impact of disclosure. The
shortcomings of current testing practices have direct implications
for other types of disclosure, such as medical decision aids and
nutritional value labels, which are often also tested through
indirect comprehension tests rather than decision-making tests.

